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FEDERAL POWER IN WESTERN WATERS: THE
NAVIGATION POWER AND THE RULE OF NO
COMPENSATION
EVA H. MORREALE *
On February 23, 1961, the Congress of the United States received President
Kennedy's "Special Message on Natural Resources."' The major presidential
proposal in the area of water conservation was the development of "compre-
hensive river basin plans by 1970." To that end, Congress was urged to "author-
ize the establishment of planning commissions for all major river basins where
adequate plans are not already in existence." President Kennedy also expressly
rejected the "no-new-starts" policy of his predecessor. The adoption of the ad-
ministration's program will once more raise the question of the precise scope of
the federal power over the nation's waterways. 2
This article is devoted to the detailed examination of one of the bases for fed-
eral activity, the "navigation power." Attention is focused on irrigation water
rights. The emphasis is justified for two reasons. One is the lack of decisions
dealing with such rights. The other is the assumption that federal activity may
well center in the arid and semi-arid western states.8 Those at least are the states
* Assistant Professor of Law, Rutgers University, Newark, N. J.
Prepared in partial fulfillment of the iequirements for the degree of Doctor of the
Science of Law in the Faculty of Law, Columbia University. I would like to acknowledge
my indebtedness and gratitude to Professors Charles Meyers and Gerald Gunther for
all the inspiration, understanding and encouragement I received from them.
1. For the full text of the message see the N. Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1961, p. 12.
2. The question has arisen and has been examined before, most frequently perhaps in
the context of state-federal relations. See, for example, Bannister, The Question of Fed-
eral Disposition of State Waters in the Priority States, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 270 (1915) ;
Corker, Water Rights and Federalism-The Western Water Rights Settlement Bill of
1957, 45 Calif. L. Rev. 604 (1957) ; Martz, The Role of the Federal Government in State
Water Law, 5 Kan. L. Rev. 626 (1957) ; Sato, Water Resources-Comments upon the
Federal-State Relationship, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 43 (1960) ; Silverstein, Jr., The Legal Con-
cept of Navigability v. Navigability in Fact, 19 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 49 (1946) ; Stone,
Federal Fersus State Control of Water, 12 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 69 (1940) ; Note, Federal-
State Conflicts over the Control of Western Waters, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 967 (1960).
3. The states commonly included in that description are Arizona, California, Colo-
rado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Okla-
homa, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington and Wyoming. In almost all
of them, prior appropriation has replaced common law rules of riparian ownership.
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where water conservation is most urgent and where irrigation is often indis-
pensable for the cultivation of the land.
In particular the paper will seek to answer these questions.
( 1 ) A "owns" a state-created consumptive water right on a navigable stream.4
Is he entitled to compensation if the United States, under specific congressional
authorization, erects a dam, thus causing the destruction or impairment of his
right ?
(2) Does a claim to compensation arise if the United States, in distributing
project water among intrastate users, ignores state-created priorities in the al-
location of the impounded water?
(3) Do the results in (1) or (2) change if A is located on a non-navigable
tributary of a navigable mainstream?
It is the contention of this paper that the United States can destroy A's rights
without compensation if two conditions are fulfilled: the United States must
proceed under the navigation power and A's property must be "affected by ' 5
the navigation servitude.6
The present investigation will deal with these conditions in that order. That
is, it will first seek to probe the scope and limits of the congressional power.
Thereafter it will deal in detail with the compensability of private property
as against a proper exercise of the navigation power. It will, in other words,
seek to ascertain just what private property is "affected by" the navigation servi-
tude.
The final part of the investigation will seek to apply the earlier findings to
consumptive water rights. Special consideration will be given to the question
whether the United States may be estopped to exercise its powers.
PART I
THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF CONGRESS
In 1824, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall stated that "All America understands,
and has uniformly understood, the word 'commerce' to comprehend navigation." 7
4. No distinction needs to be made, for purposes of this paper, between state-created
riparian and state-created appropriation water rights.
5. To use Mr. Justice Stewart's phrase. See United States v. Virginia Elec. Co.,
365 U.S. 624, 629 (1961).
6. It is important to note at the very outset that the terms "navigation power" and
"navigation serqitude" describe two related but nevertheless distinct phenomena. Navi-
gation power designates the regulatory power which Congress, under the commerce
clause and since Gibbons v. Ogden, exercises over navigable waters. Navigation servi-
tude designates the rule, to be discussed in detail later, that certain private property
may be taken in exercise of the navigation power without the payment of compensation.
Of course, a Congress willing to pay compensation could carry out a great many projects
dealing with natural resources under the commerce clause generally or under the wel-
fare clause. See United States vs. Gerlack Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950), uphold-
ing the Reclamation Act under the power to spend for the general welfare.
7. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824).
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Gibbons v. Ogden thus established control over navigation as part of the con-
trol over interstate commerce which by article I, section 8 of the Constitution
had been entrusted to the national government."
I
THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CONGRESSIONAL POWER
A. Navigable Streams
Gibbons v. Ogden declared navigation to be part of interstate commerce. It
did not define what kinds of streams were the highways of this interstate com-
merce. But it did of necessity imply that "navigable" streams were such high-
ways. The term received its definition in The Daniel Ball9 in a now famous
formulation:
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which
are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are
used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as
highways of commerce. .... lO
Once a stream was navigable under this definition, federal power extended
over its entire course. In United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co.,1 1
the Court upheld the exercise of national control over non-navigable stretches
of navigable streams in order to protect the navigable capacity downstream.' 2
Nor was there a loss of federal power if a formerly navigable stream was no
longer used for commerce and, indeed, had become "incapable of such use
according to present methods, either by reason of changed conditions or because
of artificial obstructions." ' 13 Mr. Justice Brandeis reaffirmed the proposition
"once navigable-always navigable" in the first Arizona v. California contro-
versy to reach the Court.
Commercial disuse resulting from changed geographical conditions
and a Congressional failure to deal with them, does not amount to an
8. Specifically, Gibbons v. Ogden, invalidated, as repugnant to the federal licensing
statute and thus to the supremacy clause, acts of the New York legislature granting Mr.
Fulton exclusive navigation rights of all waters within New York.
9. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870). Navigability had been defined earlier for purposes
of admiralty jurisdiction in The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851). The
Daniel Ball apparently was the first time the Court gave a definition in the navigation
context.
10. The Daniel Ball, supra note 9, at 563. The definition was a rejection of the "ebb
and flow of the tide" test of English law. See note 132 infra.
11. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
12. Here of the Rio Grande, found by the trial court and the Supreme Court of the
Territory to be non-navigable in New Mexico.
13. Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 123 (1921). The case
concerned the Desplaines River, which at the time of the decision had been out of use
for over a hundred years.
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abandonment of a navigable river or prohibit future exertion of fed-
eral control.1
4
Congress thus has power over all parts of a navigable stream. The power is
maintained although the stream falls into disuse; the failure to maintain naviga-
bility does not dislodge congressional jurisdiction.
B. The Determination of Navigability
In dealing with the scope of the federal power, the Court in these cases re-
served to itself the determination of navigability. Its criterion continued to be
the standard formulated in The Daniel Ball with its emphasis on navigability
in fact "when used or susceptible of being used [for navigation], in their ordinary
condition."15
United States v. Appalachian Power Co.16 was the next major step toward
further extension of federal control over the nation's waterways. The govern-
ment had contended that the phrase "susceptible of being used, in their ordinary
condition" should be construed so as to permit a determination of navigability
in light of the effect that reasonable improvements might have. Both lower
courts had rejected the argument. In the Supreme Court it carried the day. Mr.
Justice Reed repeated that navigability- was a factual question. But the Court
also held it to be erroneous to appraise the evidence of navigability on the natural
condition of the waterway only. "Its availability for navigation must also be
considered." 17
An immediate and rather obvious consequence of the decision was the in-
crease in the number of streams subject to federal control because "available for
navigation" after improvements.'
Not so obvious was its effect on the process of determining navigability. The-
oretically, the decision left that question in the judicial province and merely en-
larged the scope of admissible evidence. But congressional authorization of an
"improvement project" implies an affirmative judgment as to its feasibility and
practicability. If the government therefore asserts navigability of a particular
14. Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 453-54 (1931). For more recent reiterations
of the principle see Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508
(1941); Montana Power Co. v. FPC, 185 F.2d 491 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 947 (1951).
15. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). (Emphasis added.) Only on the surface is
there a conflict between the "navigable in fact" standard and the principle of continued
federal jurisdiction over formerly navigable streams. See Economy Light & Power Co.
v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921), where the Supreme Court concurred in the finding
of the court of appeals that the Desplaines River had, in its natural state, been navigable
and had carried commerce, i.e. had been navigable in fact.
16. 311 U.S. 377 (1940) (Justices Roberts and McReynolds dissented).
17. Id. at 407.
18. See also the charge of the dissenting opinion that the majority empowered Con-
gress to "create" navigability. Id. at 433.
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stream either after the actual completion or after congressional authorization
of a project, the Court would almost certainly defer to the legislative judgment.
Evidence of completion or authorization would thus be treated as conclusive
on the issue of navigability.' 9 This would limit an independent judicial inquiry
into navigability to those cases where improvements had not been completed or
have not yet been authorized. 20 Even that inquiry is limited by the Court's ad-
monition that neither completion nor authorization is necessary for a finding
of navigability. 21
One other factor makes the likelihood of an independent judicial determination
improbable. 22 As will be seen, navigability is no longer an indispensable condi-
tion for the attachment of federal jurisdiction. Given certain conditions, the
navigation power may also be exercised over non-navigable streams. Therefore
the government has to depend on proving navigability of a given stream only
where it seeks for the first time to subject to its control a stream-system in which
no stream has ever been considered navigable-whether in fact or "in the light
of the effect of'reasonable improvements."
In any event, since United States v. Appalachian, no case has been decided
against the United States on the issue of navigability. It is tempting to treat this
as proof of the absence of any judicial fact-finding process regarding navigability.
19. Nor would that result seem to be influenced if the improvement works were con-
ducted by order of the Secretary of the Army under Rivers and Harbors legislation,
rather than under specific congressional authorization. The conclusiveness of a federal
assertion of navigability should be kept distinct from the conclusiveness of a congres-
sional assertion that a given project will serve the purposes of naqvigation, discussed
infra.
20. This conclusion has applicability only in the navigation power context. Occa-
sionally title disputes have arisen between the United States and a state as to the bed
of a given stream on which the United States owns abutting land. In such disputes,
the state typically alleges that the stream is navigable. Therefore, title to the stream-bed
passed to the state as an incident of sovereignty upon admission to the Union. The
United States, on the other hand, argues that the stream is non-navigable and that title
to the bed therefore is in the United States as riparian owner. In this context, of course,
navigability clearly is a matter-of judicial determination and not of congressional asser-
tion. For cases involving such title controversies, see Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574
(1922) (United States intervened to claim the southerly half of the bed of the Red
River in Oklahoma) ; United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931) ; United States v.
Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935).
21. United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 408 (1940).
22. This does not necessarily mean that judicial re'view has become illusory. Rather,
the Court's attitude toward the issue of navigability may well be similar to its attitude
toward a congressional determination of what activities "affect commerce." See, e.g.,
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) where such a congressional determination
precluded an independent judicial determination but not a determination of "whether
the particular activity regulated or prohibited is within the reach of the federal power."
Id. at 120-21. In this context it should be noted that the Court in the Appalachian case
expressly referred to "obvious limits" to improvements as affecting navigability. The
remark leaves room for a potential review of whether in a given instance suggested
improvements would go beyond such "obvious limits."
MAY, 1963]
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In reality, it may merely prove the reasonableness of Congress in not attempting
to subject to its control every creek in the United States-notwithstanding its
theoretical power to do so. 23
C. Non-navigable Streams
As has already been mentioned, federal control is no longer limited to navig-
able streams. In Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co.,2 4 Oklahoma
sought to enjoin the construction of a federal multi-purpose dam and reservoir
project, to be located on the Red River. Inter alia, Oklahoma contended that no
part of the Red River was navigable within the state, and that the stream was
thus not subject to federal control under the navigation power.25 The Supreme
Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the bill. Mr. Justice Douglas's
opinion seemingly based the decision on the fact that "the power of flood control
extends to the tributaries of navigable streams."' 26
The case can be read more narrowly. Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out that
the lower reaches of the Red River had at one time been used for commerce.
Federal control had therefore continued under the principle of "once navigable-
always navigable." The head of navigation had been in Arkansas. However,
under the rule of United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co. 2 7 federal
control extended to all parts of the river.
Oklahoma v. Atkinson could thus be treated as a "once navigable stream" de-
cision. The status of non-navigable waters in relation to the navigation power
therefore was left in doubt.
The doubt was resolved to some extent in United States v. Grand River Dam
4uthority.28 By an act passed in 1941,29 Congress had expressly incorporated
23. Again there is an analogy to the regulatory power under the commerce clause
generally. The sum of such cases as (inter alia) NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937) ; United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) and Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942) can be used to demonstrate not only that practically all economic
activities can "affect commerce" but also to assert that the Court would defer to any
such congressional declaration. The hypothetical parade of horribles ignores that Con-
gress has, by and large, acted reasonably and assumes that judicial deference to rea-
sonable action would automatically be transferred to unreasonable, arbitrary one. It
assumes further the breakdown of sufficient political checks thus permitting such arbi-
trary action to be enacted into law in the first place. The same considerations would
seem to hold in the navigability context. Cf., Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954).
24. 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
25. No question of compensation was involved.
26. 313 U.S., 508, 525 (1941).
27. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
28. 363 U.S. 229 (1960).
29. The Grand River plan was incorporated into a comprehensive plan for the
Arkansas River basin by the Flood Control Act of August 18, 1941, 55 Stat. 638,
33 U.S.C. §§ 702a-12 (1958). See United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, supra
note 28, at 230.
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the Grand River, a non-navigable tributary of the navigable Arkansas, into a
comprehensive plan for the Arkansas basin. The stated purpose was "the benefit
of navigation and the control of destructive floodwaters" 30 to protect the Arkan-
sas River. The Court treated United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr.
Co.3 1 as clearly putting the protection of the "navigable capacity" (here of the
Arkansas) within the constitutional power of Congress. On the issue of non-
navigable tributaries, the Court referred to its "holding" in Oklahoma v. At-
kinson and repeated: "There is no constitutional reason why Congress cannot,
under the commerce power, treat the watersheds as a key to flood control on
navigable streams and their tributaries." 32
Nevertheless, the decision should not be read as a blanket subjection ipso facto
of all non-navigable streams to the navigation power. Indeed, the government
had contended that "the navigational servitude of the United States extends
also to non-navigable waters." 3 3 The government could only have thought to
30. Id. at 232.
31. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
32. United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229, 232 (1960), citing
to Oklahoma v. Atkinson.
33. Id. at 232. The government spoke of the navigation servitude rather than the
navigation po'wer because it sought to achieve two things: one, to extend federal power
to the non-navigable Grand River; two, to have the private property rights here in-
volved burdened with the servitude, thus escaping the duty to pay compensation for their
taking. For a discussion of the compensation aspect of the case, see Part II, II, D(3)
infra.
As to its argument itself, perhaps the government thought it could be supported
with dictum from the Appalachian case. That dictum described the authority of the gov-
ernment as being "as broad as the needs of commerce." Under such a criterion there
would be no room to distinguish between navigable and non-navigable waterways in
regard to congressional regulatory power. Likewise, the extent of the "needs of com-
merce" could then be said to determine the extent of the navigation servitude, i.e., the
rule that certain private property may, in the exercise of the navigation power, be taken
without compensation. See also Sato, Water Resources-Comments upon the Federal-
State Relationship, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 43, 47 (1960) suggesting that the extension of the
servitude upstream to non-navigable tributaries could "rationally be supported by the
argument that the servitude is co-extensive with the commerce power." This speculation
does not take account of two things. One, the Court in Appalachian made the statement
in connection with navigable waterways. Two, the Court may merely have meant that
Congress can exercise its powers under the commerce clause as fully when dealing with
waterways as it can when dealing with highways. The Court may not have meant to
imply immunity against compensation in the face of extra-navigational dealings. In
other words, it may have spoken of an area covered by the commerce clause but not
covered by the narrower (theoretically, at least) navigation servitude. Some support
is lent to this suggestion because Appalachian did not involve compensability of private
water rights. The Court also illustrated the "natural growth" of federal plenary power
(in connection with navigability) with United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
See United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940), note 35 of the opinion.
The Cress case, far from extending the servitude to the "needs of commerce" granted
the compensation claims of non-navigable tributary riparians. See Part II, II, C(2)
infra, for a discussion of the Cress case.
But see Federal Power Commission, Opinion No. 356, April 19, 1962 (Docket No.
MAY, 1963]
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achieve with this contention the elimination of the distinction between navigable
and non-navigable waterways. Congressional power over non-navigable water-
ways would have then existed independently rather than for the protection
of the navigable mainstream. The Court avoided the issue by finding that in
its view of the case "it is not necessary that we reach that contention. ' 34 Its
view of the case was, of course, that here the navigable capacity of the main-
stream was at stake. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co. had already
put the protection of that capacity under congressional control. There was thus
no need to decide on a broader formulation of congressional power regarding
the nation's waterways.
On its face, therefore, Grand River Dam Authority limits the exercise of the
navigation power over non-navigable streams in two ways. One, the "navigable
capacity" of the navigable mainstream must be at stake. Two, Congress must
expressly exercise its power over the non-navigable tributary. Within these limits,
non-navigable streams are subject to federal control.
D. Summary
Briefly then, this is the scope of congressional power as it emerges from these
cases:
( 1) All navigable streams are subject to the navigation power. "Navigable"
means: (a) once having been navigable;35 (b) navigable in fact;36 (c) navigable
due to reasonable improvements."
(2) Navigability is primarily a matter of congressional determination, sub-
ject to judicial review.38
(3) Non-navigable streams which affect the navigable capacity of navigable
streams are subject to the express exercise of the regulatory power.3 9
Any stream-system in the nation could therefore be subjected to federal con-
trol by making any portion of it navigable. This would bring within the scope
of the navigation power the non-navigable stretches and tributaries of the system,
E-6927). In holding that a license was required for the project involved under Section
23 (b) of the Federal Water Power Act, the Commission seems to take the position that
non-navigable streams are, without more, subject to federal jurisdiction under the
commerce power-at least where such non-navigable streams are part of a larger river
system. Of course, no issue of compensation was involved.
34. United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229, 232 (1960). It
may be argued that this merely postpones the resolution of the speculations based on
the Appalachian dictum but does not repudiate them.
35. Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941) ; Arizona
v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931) ; Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256
U.S. 113 (1921).
36. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
37. United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
38. See B, under Part I, I supra.
39. United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229 (1960) ; Oklahoma
ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
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if affecting the capacity of the mainstream. 40 Theoretically at least, there are
no waters in the United States immune from the navigation power. 41
II
THE LIMITS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF CONGRESS
A. The Purposes For Which The Navigation Power May Be Exercised
As will be shown in some detail later, historically the public right to naviga-
tion was intended to secure free and unhindered passage. In England the public
right was limited to a "right of way" 42 on the navigable stream itself with such
incidental privileges as were necessary for its exercise. The jurisdiction of the
Crown as "trustee and conservator" of the public right consequently was to re-
form and punish nuisances in all rivers that were a common passage, as well as
to conserve navigability. 4
3
In the United States, Gibbons v. Ogden 44 made clear that the delegation of
the power to regulate commerce vested in the national government the power
to regulate navigation. For two reasons it was logical to assume that the pro-
tection and maintenance of navigation was the basis, the measure and the limit
of the regulatory power. One was the historical content of the right of navigation
as the right of the public to free passage. That content in turn had led to the
historical role of the sovereign as the protector and conservator of the public
right. The other was that the Court in Gibbons v. Ogden spoke of the power
over commerce. That again implied that congressional power would be limited
to measures (including prohibitory measures) serving the protection and main-
tenance of that commerce.
45
Language in some of the early cases reflected these assumptions as to the
limitation of the congressional power. In United States v. Rio Grande Dam &
40. For similar conclusions as to the sweeping reach of potential federal jurisdiction
see Sato, Water Resources-Comments upon the Federal-State Relationship, 48 Calif.
L. Rev. 43 (1960) ; Silverstein, Jr., The Legal Concept of Navigability v. Navigability
in Fact, 19 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 49 (1946).
41. Whether this means that within the foreseeable future every creek in the United
States will be federally regulated is another matter. Most likely, large-scale congressional
dealings with the nation's waterways will be in the context of dam and reservoir projects.
By their very nature, such projects would seem to require a sufficiently substantial
stream system to make the project worthwhile. Hence it seems likely that once again
theoretical and practical limits of congressional power are not co-extensive.
42. Coulson & Forbes, Waters and Land Drainage 507 (6th ed. 1952) (hereinafter
cited as Coulson & Forbes): "The right of navigation is simply a right of way and
the right of navigation in tidal waters is a right of way thereover for all the public
for all purposes of navigation, trade and intercourse."
43. The power of conservancy was early delegated to various subordinate authori-
ties, of which the Commissioners of Sewers were the most important. Id. at 552.
44. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
45. In South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4 (1876) the Court sustained the power
of Congress to obstruct navigation in one place in order to promote it elsewhere.
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Irr. Co. the Court spoke of the federal jurisdiction as exercisable for the
purpose of taking "all needed measures to preserve the navigability of the navig-
able watercourses of the country." 46
Subsequent cases reiterated that the United States was limited in its dealings
with navigable rivers "to the control thereof for purposes of navigation. '" 47
Thus it appears as though the power to control navigation at one time meant
that Congress was exercising a role of "trustee" and "conservator" similar in
some respects at least to that exercised by the king.48
United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 49 Oklahoma v. Atkinson, 50 and
United States v. Grand River Dam Authority"' upheld flood control and water-
shed development projects as constitutionally sanctioned measures available for
the preservation of navigable waterways. The magnitude of some of these proj-
ects is common knowledge. That very magnitude gives a sweep to the federal
power which bears little resemblance to the power expressed in the 22nd chapter
of Magna Carta providing that "all weirs from henceforth shall be utterly put
down through Thames and Medway, and through all England." 52 One common
bond nevertheless remains. Flood control and watershed development projects
can (though need not necessarily) be as much of an exercise of the prerogative
to protect navigation as "putting down weirs." Totally dissimilar conditions
merely produce totally dissimilar ways in which to exercise the prerogative.
Appalachian, Oklahoma v. Atkinson and Grand River Dam still leave the prop-
osition intact that the right of the public to free and unhindered passage is
the basis and measure of the federal power.
The appearance of so-called multi-purpose projects on the other hand" con-
stituted a marked departure from the traditional content of sovereign dealings
46. 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899).
47. Port of Seattle v. Oregon & W. R.R., 255 U.S. 56 (1921) is typically cited for
that proposition. Actually, the controversy was between the Port of Seattle, a municipal
corporation, and the railroad. At issue was the right of the railroad as owner of land
adjoining East Waterway in Port of Seattle to build piers, etc. over which to secure
access to a navigable channel. United States v. River Rouge Co., 269 U.S. 411 (1926)
used similar language in describing the federal right. At issue was the propriety of a
jury charge emphasizing the element of uncertainty inherent in the privileges riparian
owners enjoy.
48. In one respect, the congressional power was broader even at this point. Accord-
ing to South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4 (1876), Congress could obstruct navigation
in one place to promote it somewhere else. The right to legalize encroachments for the
benefit of navigation was in England reserved to Parliament. See Gould, Waters § 21
(3rd ed. 1900) (hereinafter cited as Gould).
49. 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
50. 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
51. 363 U.S. 229 (1960).
52. See Coulson & Forbes 552, giving this example of the nature of the king's juris-
diction.
53. Typically, the "extra-navigational" purposes served are the development and
disposition of power.
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with navigable waterways. The constitutionality of such projects had its first
proponent in Mr. Justice Brandeis:
[T]hat purposes other than navigation will also be served could not
invalidate the exercise of the authority conferred, even if those other
purposes would not alone have justified an exercise of Congressional
power.
5 4
The use of the word also seems to imply that Mr. Justice Brandeis intended
a requirement that navigation be the primary purpose. If so, then his statement
had acquired a certain "gloss" by the time it reappeared in Oklahoma v. A4tkinson
as authority for this proposition:
[T]hat ends other than flood control will also be served, or that flood
control may be relatively of lesser importance, does not invalidate the
exercise of the authority conferred on Congress . . . Arizona v. Cali-
fornia. .... Il
In the conflict between "primary" and "other" purposes the balance thus
had been shifted in favor of "other" purposes. In United States v. Twin City
Power Co.56 finally, the Court sanctioned a project which at best benefited
navigation incidentally. That at least was the manner in which the House Re-
port accompanying the Savannah River Clark Hill Project described the navi-
gational aspects of the project. 57
For the time being, this is where the matter rests. The rule that evolves from
these cases supports federal projects in the name of the navigation power for
non-navigation purposes. The origin of the power still demands that one purpose
be the protection or the improvement of navigation. But once that requirement
has been complied with, Congress may in effect use the waters of both navigable
and non-navigable streams for whatever purposes it wishes.5" For that matter, it
54. Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 456 (1931). (Emphasis added.)
55. Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 534 (1941). (Em-
phasis added.) But see United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945)
where the Court cited the Arizona v. California "original version" without the Okla-
homa "gloss."
56. 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
57. See H. R. Doc. No. 657, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 66-67 (1944) to the effect that a
suitably constructed project would "incidentally reduce downstream flood damages and
improve low-water flows for navigation." (Emphasis added.) The court of appeals had
proceeded from an earlier finding in Savannah River Elec. Co. v. FPC, 164 F.2d 408
(4th Cir. 1947) that navigation improvement was not the congressional purpose. It is
not clear whether the court meant not the primary purpose or not a purpose at all. For
the proposition that the tenor of the entire report made it clear that the project was
primarily undertaken for the development of power, see 56 Colum. L. Rev. 793 (1956).
58. At least where it expressly exercises its power over the non-navigable tributary,
as opposed to an exercise of the power on the navigable mainstream only with inci-
dentally injurious effects on the non-navigable tributary. See Part II, II infra.
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is not even necessary that such "other" purposes are constitutionally sanctioned."9
Congress may for instance "go into the business" of selling power if incidental
to such an enterprise there is a benefit to navigation. 60
A number of conclusions thus become inevitable. For one, navigation has
ceased to be the measure and the limit of federal power. That has occurred
through the sanctioning of multi-purpose projects, especially through the sanc-
tioning of a project that only incidentally "benefited" navigation. Obviously,
this constitutes a complete departure from the raison d'itre of the navigation
power. That power was supposed to do nothing more than secure to the public
the free and unhindered passage on its waterways. Finally, and by historical
necessity only, navigation has remained the basis, the constitutional touchstone of
federal power. Unless all attempts at maintaining a semblance of historical
justification are abandoned, it will therefore be necessary for congressional proj-
ects to "serve" navigation, albeit incidentally.
The requirement of at least an incidental benefit to navigation affords a
theoretical check over the exercise of so vast a congressional power. Whether
such a check, in the form of judicial control, actually exists is the question to
which we next turn.
B. Judicial Supervision Over The Congressional
Exercise Of The Navigation Power
Judicial supervision over congressional dealings in the name of navigation has
failed to be an effective check of congressional power. It has failed because the
Court has from the very outset pursued a policy of non-interference with con-
gressional judgments. More than that, it has followed a policy of accepting at
face value congressional declarations that particular projects are necessary for
or would "benefit" navigation. The first important "modern" case raising the
problem was United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co."1 It gave
the Court an opportunity to deal with the question of judicial review in the face
of a congressional declaration of purpose regarding a particular stream. The act
59. See Mr. Justice Brandeis's language from Arizona v. California, note 54 supra.
60. It is assumed here that no attempt is made to support such an enterprise with
the commerce power generally or with some other delegated power, thus leaving no
other constitutionally sanctioned basis for the federal activity.
61. 229 U.S. 53 (1913). The tone had been set as early as 1855, however, in Pennsyl-
vania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855). The Supreme
Court had declared the defendant's bridge across the Ohio River to be an obstruction
to navigation and had ordered it removed. Subsequent to the decree, an act of Congress
declared the bridges across the Ohio to be lawful structures. Held: the decree could
no longer be enforced, since there was no longer any interference with the public right.
In so holding, the Court spoke of the regulation of commerce as including "navigation,
and, of course, the power to determine what shall or shall not be deemed in judgment
of law an obstruction to navigation." Id. at 431. Mr. Justice McLean charged in his
dissent that the congressional act was an unconstitutional attempt to "alter a fact"
found to be so by the Court. Id. at 439.
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involved merely stated that ownership of the stream in fee simple absolute was
"necessary for the purpose of navigation of said waters." 62 The Court concluded:
that the question of whether the proper regulation of navigation of
this river at the place in question required that no construction of any
kind should be placed or continued in the river . . . and whether the
whole flow of the stream should be conserved for the use and safety of
navigation, are questions legislative in character; and when Congress
determined . . . that the whole river . . . was necessary for the pur-
poses of navigation . . . that determination was conclusive.63
Thus the Court declined to exercise its own judgment as to what was neces-
sary for the regulation, protection, or improvement of navigation. 64 Presumably,
some retention of judicial control could be implied from the statement that Con-
gress had not acted "arbitrarily" in appropriating the entire flow of the river
for navigation purposes.6 5 However, the judicial control so retained has remained
dormant. The Court has never found congressional "navigation measures" to
be unreasonable or arbitrary. 66
Two years later the Court retreated further. In Greenleaf Lumber Co. v.
Garrison6 7 it made clear that the conclusiveness of the congressional judgment
embraced the determination of what was or was not an obstacle to navigation.
Again there was an indication that arbitrary action might meet with judicial
review. Again, there is no case that has realized that warning.68
In Arizona v. California,"9 Arizona gave its attack on the Boulder Canyon
Project Act 7" a different emphasis. It urged that the act's recital of navigation
was a mere subterfuge. Having refused to examine congressional providence, the
Court, predictably enough, declined to examine congressional consciences.
62. Act of Congress of March 3, 1909, ch. 264., § 11, 35 Stat. 820, cited in United
States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 56 (1913).
63. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., supra note 62, at 65.
64. The Chandler-Dunbar case was decided in 1913. Until 1937, the Court exercised
a formidable amount of judicial control over the exercise of the commerce power. It
would be interesting to know the reasons for the totally different attitude toward the
congressional use of the navigation power.
65. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 66 (1913).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956) and United
States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229 (1960), both discussed infra.
67. 237 U.S. 251 (1915).
68. And again, of course, the question arises whether that phenomenon is attributable
to judicial deference or to congressional reasonableness. See also note 23 supra.
69. 283 U.S. 423 (1931).
70. The Boulder Canyon Project Act was enacted December 21, 1928, ch. 42, 45 Stat.
1057.
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Into the motives which induced members of Congress to enact the
Boulder Canyon Project Act, this Court may not enquire.7'
As for the measures proposed in the act, the Court thought them "not un-
related to the control of navigation." It reiterated that their reasonable neces-
sity was for Congress to determine. 72
Thus Arizona v. California relinquished the judicial hold over congressional
declarations professing to exercise the navigation power.73 All that remained was
the suggestion of an independent assessment of the nexus between the proposed
means and navigation. 74 It is possible that the mere suggestion of such an inde-
pendent assessment has had a certain restraining influence on Congress. If so,
that has been its sole contribution to the history of Congress and the navigation
power. 75
Almost twenty years later, in United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 76 the
Court suddenly gave notice that judicial review might yet come to mean more
than the almost automatic acceptance of congressional declarations. 77 The case
involved the Central Valley project in California and more particularly, Friant
71. 283 U.S. 423, 455 (1931). Only five years later, in United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1 (1936), the majority of the Court struck down the Agricultural Adjustment Act
after an extended examination of the congressional purpose.
72. Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 456 (1931).
73. See also Corwin concluding that the Court "has come, in effect, to hold that it
will sustain any act of Congress 'which purports to be for the improvement of navigation
.... " The Constitution of the United States of America, Prepared by the Legislative
Service, Library of Congress, Ed. S. Corwin 131 (1952). (Emphasis added.) The in-
evitability of that conclusion (as well as of the one reached in the text) becomes even
clearer when it is considered that in Arizona v. California, for instance, the Court must
have been aware that the Boulder Dam project had to destroy downstream navigation-
given the already then existing, clearly established, irrigation demands.
74. It could of course be argued that there is (today at least) no greater control in
other areas of regulation and that there is consequently nothing unique about the navi-
gation power. Undeniably, in many instances judicial control over regulatory powers
is limited to an assessment of "nexus." And if that assessment actually occurred in the
navigation context, there would indeed be nothing much unique about the navigation
power. However, the facts of Arizona v'. California make it rather doubtful that the
assessment exists anywhere but on paper.
75. See also United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411, 419 (1926).
Finding that the trial court's charge to the jury had overemphasized the uncertainty of
riparian rights, the Court spoke of the necessity of "some positive relation to navigation"
preventing Congress from arbitrarily destroying riparian rights by legislation which
"has no real or substantial relation to control of navigation or appropriateness to that
end."
76. 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
77. In the meantime, the Court had reaffirmed its "hands off" attitude. See United
States v. Commodore Park Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945) (destruction of navigability in one
place to promote navigation elsewhere) ; United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power
Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
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Dam. At issue was the compensability of certain state-created water rights. 78
Ultimately the Court held that the federal government had the constitutional
power to construct reclamation works under the Reclamation Act 79 as an inci-
dent of the power to spend for the general welfare. That power does not carry
with it immunity against compensation as does the navigation power. Under
section 8 of the Reclamation Act therefore, the federal government had to pay
for the impairment of private property.80
The government had sought to avoid compensability by bringing the project
under the navigation power. The project had been authorized in the Rivers and
Harbors Act of August 26, 1937 and again in the Rivers and Harbors Act of
October 17, 1940.81 In both enactments, Congress said that "the entire Central
Valley project .. . is . ..declared to be for the purposes of improving navi-
gation .... "82
The government contended that this overall declaration of purpose applied to
Friant Dam; consequently the rule of no compensation was said to apply to the
destruction of riparian interests. Friant Dam finally was described as involving
"a measure of flood control, an end of which is sensibly related to control of
navigation." 8 3
The Court found no congressional intent to exercise the navigation power.8 4
78. The claimants were owners of so-called "uncontrolled grass lands." Their claim
was for the unhindered enjoyment of the natural, seasonal fluctuation of the San Joaquin
River. The project was to put an end to such largely unutilized peak flow. 339 U.S. at 730.
79. Reclamation Act of 1902, 32 Stat. 388, as amended, 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-615 (1958).
80. "That nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or
to in any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control,
appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested right
acquired thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions
of this Act, shall proceed in conformity with such laws, and nothing herein shall in any
way affect any right of any State or of the Federal Government or of any landowner,
appropriator, or user of water in, to, or from any interstate stream or the waters thereof:
Provided, That the right to the use of water acquired under the provisions of this Act
shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the
measure, and the limit of the right." Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, § 8, 32 Stat. 390.
81. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1937, ch. 832, § 2, 50 Stat. 850, and Rivers and Har-
bors Act of 1940, ch. 895, § 2, 54 Stat. 1199, respectively. See United States v. Gerlach
Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 731 (1950).
82. 339 U.S. at 731.
83. Id. at 736.
84. The Court arrived at its conclusion notwithstanding the recital of navigation in
the two enactments of the Rivers and Harbors Act mentioned above. A number of
factors explain this result. One, the 1937 and 1940 enactments "reauthorized" a project
initiated by President Roosevelt in 1935 by the allotment of funds for Friant Dam
under the Federal Emergency Relief Appropriation Act. The original authorization of
the Friant Dam project had provided that it be "reimbursable in accordance with the
reclamation laws." Two, the Secretary of the Interior had at the time made a "finding
of feasibility" required for projects under the Reclamation Act. His finding made no
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Consequently, it did not decide the constitutional issue. But neither did it en-
tirely by-pass the problem.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether a general declaration of pur-
pose is controlling where interference with navigation is neither the
means . . . nor the consequence . . . of its advancement elsewhere.
Similarly, we need not ponder whether, by virtue of a highly fictional
navigation purpose, the Government could destroy the flow of a navi-
gable stream . . . without compensation. . . . We have never held
that or anything like it, and we need not here pass on the question of
constitutional power .... 85
Whatever import these words would turn out to have, by no means could
the Gerlach case be read as a rejection of the "superior rights theory" of the
navigation servitude, as has been contended.8 6 More likely, the intention was to
signal an end of the Court's acquiescence into judicially unchecked congressional
dealings with the nation's waterways. If so, the ominous sounds faded when Mr.
Justice Douglas reasserted, in United States v. Twin City Power Co.:
It is not for courts, however, to substitute their judgments for congres-
sional decisions on what is or is not necessary for the improvement
or protection of navigation. . . . The decision of Congress that this
project will serve the interests of navigation involves engineering and
policy considerations for Congress and Congress alone to evaluate.
Courts should respect that decision until and unless it is shown to in-
volve an impossibility .... 87
reference to navigation. Three, the congressional "reauthorization" again made refer-
ence to reclamation laws. Finally, both the Friant Dam and San Joaquin projects had
been administered by the Bureau of Reclamation.
85. 339 U.S. at 737. (Emphasis added.) But note the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas
(concurring in part and dissenting in part) at 756. He leaves no doubt that but for the
congressional agreement to pay, which he sees contained in section 8 of the Reclamation
Act, no rights existed which could have withstood the exercise of the navigation power.
And see also note, The Supreme Court, 1949 Term, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 114, 137 (1950)
pointing to the striking feature of Gerlach, which allows recovery to riparians on navi-
gable streams in the states covered by the Reclamation Act where the owners of similar
"property" in others states would not be allowed compensation.
86. See Graham, The Central Valley Project: Resource Development of a Natural
Basin, 38 Calif. L. Rev. 588, 600 (1950). But see Note, Western Water Rights-May They
Be Taken Without Compensation? 13 Mont. L. Rev. 102 (1952).
87. 350 U.S. 222, 224 (1956). (Emphasis added.) Justices Burton, Frankfurter, Min-
ton and Harlan dissented. The dissenters thought it unnecessary to discuss whether the
project was primarily in the interest of navigation, since in any event the United States
had the power of eminent domain. This obscures the vital distinction between the navi-
gation power and the power of eminent domain, i.e., that compensation may not be
payable under one but is payable under the other.
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Thus all was quiet again on the Potomac. Furthermore, it remained that way.
In United States v. Grand River Dam Authority88 the Court spoke once more
of the legislative character of the determination that a given project will bene-
fit navigation.
All of this means that Congress is the body that determines the measure and
limit of the navigation power. The Court plays practically no role in this deter-
mination, absent obviously arbitrary and capricious congressional action.8 9 It
has limited itself instead to noting and accepting at face value the perfunctory
reference to navigation as the basis of the respective congressional project so
reciting it. That at least seems to be the Court's position where Congress makes
clear that it is exercising the navigation power. But Congress does not always
make that clear. What the Court does in face of ambiguous congressional dec-
larations is therefore the next question briefly to be explored.
C. ,mbiguities In Congressional Enactments
United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co.90 raised the question whether a gen-
eral declaration to improve navigation9 lets the United States appropriate
water and water rights of particular streams without compensation. The case
did not answer the question. Nor did it give much indication of the Court's
attitude.9 2 That came for the first time in FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power
Corp.'8 The Commission argued that such state-created rights as were in-
volved 9 4 could constitutionally be abolished without compensation and that
Congress had already done so. The Court had no quarrel with the first of these
contentions. As to the second, however, it required a "clear authorization" such
as had been present in United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co.9 5
88. 363 U.S. 229 (1960).
89. It would seem that the "showing of an impossibility" (Twin City) allows for an
even narrower margin of judicial review than the evaluation of the nexus-even assum-
ing such an evaluation actually takes place. But see note 74 supra.
90. 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
91. Here contained in the 1937 and 1940 Rivers and Harbors Acts. See notes 81 and 84
supra.
92. Nor do such cases as United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229
(1960) ; Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941) ; Arizona
v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931) ; United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power
Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913). These cases all involve acts of Congress dealing expressly with
the rivers concerned in the respective projects.
93. 347 U.S. 239 (1954) (Justices Douglas, Black and Minton dissented and Justices
Reed and Jackson took no part in the decision).
94. The rather complex question raised was whether the Federal Water Power Act
of 1920 had abolished state-created, private proprietary rights to the use of water of
navigable streams for power purposes. If so, then the FPC would be justified in disallow-
ing expenses paid by the licensee for the use of such rights from being deducted in the
computation of his amortization reserve under section 10(d) of the act.
95. 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
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It failed to find in the Federal Water Power Act an "express" assertion of the
governmental right to use the flow of a navigable stream to the exclusion of
existing users.
The requirements of a "clear authorization" and an "express assertion" of the
superior federal right were drawn into doubt by the Twin City decision. 6 By
admission of both Congress and Court the project benefited navigation only
incidentally.9 7 Nevertheless, the Court attributed to Congress an intent to in-
voke the navigation power. It has been argued that this attribution was a modi-
fication of the Niagara Mohawk rule.9 s Undoubtedly, there was no "clear
assertion" in Twin City that the Clark Hill project was an exercise of the
navigation power. By the same token, Congress did speak in terms of particular
rivers and basins. The Twin City case therefore did not answer the question
whether Congress may appropriate without compensation the waters of a parti-
cular river, if it relies only on a general statutory declaration. FPC v. Niagara
Mohawk Power Corp. strongly suggests a negative answer. United States v.
Twin City Power Co. does not suggest an affirmative one. Consequently pru-
dence alone would seem to make it advisable for the United States to precede the
appropriation of particular waterways with an "express assertion" of its superior
right.99
D. Summary
The conclusions reached in this chapter can be summarized in these
propositions:
(1) The protection or improvement of navigation has remained the con-
stitutional touchstone of congressional power.'00
(2) The protection or improvement of navigation has not remained the
measure and the limit of congressional power. Under the auspices of the naviga-
tion power, Congress may engage in extra-navigational projects which would,
but for some connection with navigation, lack constitutional authorization. The
constitutionality of such projects seems assured as long as navigation is benefited,
although only incidentally. 1 1
96. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
97. See note 57 supra.
98. See 56 Colum. L. Rev. 795 (1956).
99. This conclusion does not bar the United States from preventing interferences
with the navigable capacity of the nation's waterways under the Rivers and Harbors
Act. Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 907, § 7, 26 Stat. 454; Rivers and Harbors Act. 30 Stat. 1151
(1899), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-26 (1958). Passage of rivers and harbors legisla-
tion constituted an exercise by Congress of its power to regulate navigation. Any burden
thereby cast on the states or private individuals falls under the rule of no compensation,
although no express declaration precedes individual measures taken under the act.
100. United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229 (1960) ; United
States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956) ; Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy
F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941) ; Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931).
101. See cases cited note 100 supra.
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(3) A congressional declaration that a given project will serve the interests
of navigation is legislative in character and non-reviewable save for a showing
of impossibility. 10 2
(4) A congressional judgment regarding the reasonableness of the means
chosen for the protection or improvement of navigation is conclusive and non-
reviewable save for a showing of obvious arbitrariness.' 0 a
(5) Congressional declarations of dealings with the nation's waterways
should contain a clear assertion of the navigation power.' 0 4
PARTI
THE NAVIGATION SERVITUDE
I
THE RULE OF NO COMPENSATION
A. Introduction
In the preceding discussion, reference has been made to the "navigation servi-
tude"-as a shorthand expression for the rule that in the exercise of the naviga-
tion power certain private property may be taken without compensation.1°5 That
rule has been the occasion for speaking of the unique character of the navigation
power as compared to other regulatory powers.' What such descriptions drive
at is this: control over navigation was in Gibbons v. Ogden described as part
of the control over interstate commerce. The description has been adhered to
ever since.' 0 7 Yet the navigation power is said to differ in one striking regard from
other aspects of the power over interstate commerce and, for that matter, from
other regulatory powers. In the exercise of these other powers Congress may
102. United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229 (1960); United
States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
103. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956), United States v.
Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945) ; United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power
Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940) ; Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931) ; United States v.
Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
104. FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239 (1954) ; United States v.
Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950). But see United States v. Twin City Power
Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
105. The rule is also spoken of as the "superior navigation easement," see, e.g.,
United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229, 231 (1960) or the "dominant
servitude," see, e.g., FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239, 249 (1954).
106. See for instance Powell, Just Compensation and the Navigation Power, 31 Wash.
L. Rev. 271 (1956) ; Sato, Water Resources-Comments upon the Federal-State Rela-
tionship, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 43 (1960) ; Note, Federal-State Conflicts over the Control of
Western Waters, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 967 (1960).
107. See for instance Mr. Justice Douglas in United States v. Grand River Dam
Authority, 363 U.S. 229, 233 (1960): "When the United States appropriates the flow
either of a navigable or a nonnavigable stream pursuant to its superior power under
the Commerce Clause. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
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take private property for public purposes but only upon payment of just com-
pensation, as required by the fifth amendment.' 08 But where Congress exercises
the navigation power, the basic inhibitory principle against the taking of private
property without compensation is said in effect to break down. Congress may
thus destroy or impair with impunity certain private rights and values in water
courses-for which it would have to pay full compensation were it to destroy
the same, identical rights in the exercise of a different power. 10 9
Two caveats have to be sounded before this description of the navigation
servitude and its "unique" character can be accepted as correct. One is that the
rule applies only to "certain" private property. 110 It would thus be misleading to
assume that the scope of the navigation power is commensurate with the naviga-
tion servitude. In other words, power and servitude are not interchangeable
concepts. Rather, given a proper exercise of the power, the question still left to
be examined is in all cases: are these private property rights burdened with or
affected by the servitude?
The second point goes to the contrast between the navigation power and other
regulatory powers. The assertion is that under the former certain private property
may be taken without compensation which under the latter would be compen-
sable. As will be seen, the cases bear out the assertion. Nevertheless, some quali-
fication of too sweeping a claim for uniqueness is in order. Under all regulatory
powers property rights may be "diminished" albeit not "taken"-and an im-
pressive array of cases attests to the often thin line between non-compensable
"regulation" and compensable "taking" of property. 111
Certainly at least some of the "servitude cases" can be explained as involving
non-compensable regulation or "consequential injury" without necessitating re-
course to unique compensation rules.' 1 2
108. See International Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399 (1931) where the
United States took the petitioner's right to use water in a power canal in the exercise
of the war power. Payment of compensation was required. And see the Gerlach Live
Stock case again (although not involving a regulatory power) upholding the power of
the federal government to spend for the general welfare and to take state-created water
rights upon payment of compensation.
109. See International Paper Co., supra note 108.
110. As a matter of fact, Part II, II, infra, is devoted to the detailed examination ofjust what rights are destructible without compensation.
111. See Mr. Justice Holmes's discussion of the "regulation" versus "taking" problem
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412 (1922). And compare United
States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952) where destruction of private
property (to prevent its use by the Japanese) by the armed forces was held not to be a
compensable taking. "This Court has long recognized that in wartime many losses must
be attributed solely to the fortunes of war, and not to the sovereign. No rigid rules can
be laid down to distinguish compensable losses from noncompensable losses. Each case
must be judged on its own facts." Id. at 155-56 (Justices Douglas and Black dissented).
112. The requirement that there must be a "direct" appropriation rather than merely
"consequential injury" resulting from the exercise of a lawful power goes back to The
Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870). See Corwin, supra note 73, at 867,
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Nevertheless, there remains a crucial area wherein private property is taken
(rather than regulated or injured consequentially) and where no compensation
is payable if Congress proceeds under the navigation power, but where compen-
sation would be payable if Congress had exercised another of its regulatory
powers. That area may appropriately be spoken of as unique and the no compen-
sation rule governing it as anomalous. Yet the rule is firmly established. But for
all its unquestioned acceptance, there is little explanation of its origin or basis
to be found in either the cases or the literature.
B. Explanations Offered By The Cases
The Supreme Court, in its earliest as well as in its latest opinions, typically
refers to the navigation power as a "dominant right," a "right of plenary nature,"
a "superior power." 1 8 Both the states and the people are said always to have been
subject to this "established prerogative."114 By definition therefore, the exercise
of the prerogative is held not to result in a taking of property because the owner's
title is "at best a qualified one . . . subordinate to the public right of
navigation." 115
The explanation is unsatisfactory. All powers of the federal government are
"superior." They are superior in the sense that they are capable of pre-empting
state legislation.116 Thus they can subject the states as well as the people to the
"superior power" of the national government. By the same reasoning, all titles
to private property can be said to be "qualified" because all such titles can be
subordinated to "superior" federal power in those areas in which the national
government has power to become active. It does not follow, however, that the
owner of the potentially subordinate title is "therefore" not entitled to compensa-
citing to United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1946) as establishing the more
recent test that property is taken "when inroads are made upon an owner's use of it to
an extent that, as between private parties, a servitude has been acquired either by
agreement or in course of time."
Note, too, that the Court itself has in a number of cases expressely based its decision
(in part if not in whole) on general principles of eminent domain, especially the notion
of "consequential injury." See, e.g., the "access cases," Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S.
269 (1897) and Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229, 233 (1960)
("superior power") ; United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 224-25 (1956)
("The power is a dominant one which can be asserted to the exclusion of any competing
or conflicting one.") ; Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 276 (1897) ("the dominant
right of the government"); South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4 (1876) ("plenary
power"). To the extent that the "plenary" language is sought to be supported by Gibbons
-u. Ogden, that use of the case overlooks that Mr. Chief Justice Marshall was addressing
himself to the question of federal-state relations and not to any issue arising under the
fifth amendment.
114. United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229 (1960).
115. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 62 (1913).
116. Whether Congress has done so is not a question of its constitutional power but
of its intent in the given instance.
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tion upon its destruction. The supremacy of federal power vis-A-vis state-created
private property is one question. It has been settled in favor of the federal gov-
ernment. Whether or not the United States should pay a price in the form of
just compensation for the exercise of its power is another, quite different ques-
tion. In the adoption of the fifth amendment that question has been answered in
favor of the individual owner-at least where his property has indeed been
taken. 17 That is, in principle at least private property is subordinate but
compensable.
The fact of subordination of private water rights to the "public right of navi-
gation"' 18 therefore does not per se explain their non-compensability. Nor does
it explain why the very same rights must be compensated if the United States
destroys them in exercise of a different, yet presumably equally "superior"
power.119 The insufficiency of the Court's explanation becomes especially ap-
parent in light of the persistent characterization of the servitude as derived from
and indeed narrower than the commerce power. 120 The characterization as but
part of one of the constitutionally delegated regulatory powers makes the rule
of no compensation all the more anomalous.
C. Explanation Offered By The Literature
Nor can much help be found in the literature on the navigation power where
it deals at all with the origin of the no compensation rule. For the most part,
it merely accepts the explanation of the Supreme Court.' 2 ' The commerce power
is said to include control over navigation. That control in turn is described
as "complete" and private usufructuary rights are acquired subject to whatever
paramount rights have always existed. 1 22 One writer has suggested that:
The primary determination is one of property rights. It is self-evident
that all property rights possessed by the United States cannot be private
117. Again this remark must be understood against the background of the "regula-
tion" versus "taking" problems and such cases as United States V. Caltex, note 111 supra.
118. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
119. Such as the war power, relied on in International Paper Co. v. United States,
282 U.S. 399 (1931).
120. See Mr. Justice Burton in United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S.
799, 808 (1950) : "It is not the broad constitutional power to regulate commerce, but
rather the servitude derived from that power and narrower in scope, that frees the
Government from liability in these cases."
121. For that matter, most of the writers focus their investigation on other problems
and take the rule more or less for granted.
122. See Sato, Water Resources-Comments upon the Federal-State Relationship, 48
Calif. L. Rev. 43 (1960). Again, there is no further inquiry into the origin of the rule.
Nor is there any explanation as to why the navigation power is so much more "complete"
than the commerce power generally or any of the other regulatory powers.
[VOL.3
FEDERAL PO WER IN WESTERN WATERS
property, and that the exercise of these rights does not involve loss to
any private owner. 1
23
In order therefore to show a compensable injury, the claimant would have
to possess property rights unburdened by the servitude, for rights that are bur-
dened are not legally protected. Far from providing the "consistent measure of
compensation" claimed for this "servitude analysis," it leaves the most impor-
tant question unanswered. The question of course is an indication as to the basis
for such a "property right" of the United States.
124
D. The "'Notice Theory"
A degree of justification for the rule of no compensation could perhaps be
found in a sort of "notice theory." The Supreme Court has never developed a
sound and comprehensive notice theory as an explanation or justification for
the rule of no compensation. But it has at times bolstered the rejection of com-
pensation claims by reference to the claimant's "knowledge" of the superior
federal right. 125 In other words, all who make use of navigable waterways
presumably "know" that any rights they may acquire are subject to destruction
without compensation. Therefore they make investments at their own risk and
cannot reasonably expect to be protected. There is a superficial analogy to certain
aspects of zoning law. If land has been restricted for residential use, payment
upon condemnation is made for the restricted use. The value of any subsequently
created non-conforming use would be disregarded. 126 It is questionable whether
the disregard is based solely on "notice." More likely it merely follows from the
refusal of the state, expressed in a valid police regulation, to sanction the creation
of such a property right. Nevertheless, notice of the restriction does help to make
the expectation of compensation for the non-conforming use unreasonable. Pre-
existing non-conforming uses on the other hand require compensation in terms
of their existing value. Protection is thus given to the reasonable expectations
of those who relied on the state of the law at the time of their investment.
Similarly, waterways could be said to be "restricted." That is, they may be used
123. Powell, Just Compensation and the Navigation Power, 31 Wash. L. Rev. 271
(1956).
124. See also Comment, Constitutional Law-Eminent Domain-Condemnation of
Riparian Lands under the Commerce Power, 55 Mich. L. Rev. 272 (1956) which speaks
of a "quasi-proprietary right" of the United States, an explanation that leaves substan-
tially the same question. And see Part II, I, E infra, for the proposition that there was
never any recognition of the jus privatum of the Crown in this country which could con-
ceivably serve as the basis for a proprietary claim.
125. See, e.g., Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States, 242 U.S. 409 (1917) ; Union
Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907). Both cases are discussed in Part II, II, B
infra.
126. 6 Powell, Real Property § 869 (1958).
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only as long as the United States does not invoke its "plenary power" to abolish
private rights completely or to condition their exercise. Since the restriction has
"always" existed, pre-existing uses are not possible. All uses are subsequent ones
and reliance on their continued existence or protection is unreasonable.127
The analogy is superficial and the notice theory unsatisfactory. First of all,
it is doubtful to what extent notice of some superior (though obviously not fed-
eral) right can be said to have existed in the original colonies.' 28 Secondly,
knowledge that one's title to private property is "qualified" and potentially sub-
ordinate to a dominant power does not per se make it unreasonable to expect com-
pensation for investments made prior to the actual exercise of that power. As has
already been pointed out, the supremacy of the sovereign power and the com-
pensability of private property are two separate questions. It was not unreason-
able to expect compensation for the exercise of the "superior" war power.'2 9 It
was not automatically unreasonable to expect compensation for the exercise of the
"superior" navigation power. Yet there was as much notice of one power as there
was of the other. Nor could it have been clear at the outset just what private
property rights were non-compensable if destroyed in the exercise of the naviga-
tion power. 130 Today, of course, the situation is different. However anomalous
the no compensation rule may be, there is ample knowledge of its existence.
Presumably therefore, investments made today are made without reliance on a
right to compensation and any such expectation would be unreasonable. This
consideration is of small comfort to those whose investments antedate the gradual
determination of the magnitude of the federal power.
Finally, the notice theory fails to take account of two pertinent developments.
One is the constitutionally sanctioned increase in federal activity under the navi-
gation power from its humble beginnings in Gibbons v. Ogden. The other is the
expansion of the word "navigable." Today that expansion subjects streams to
federal control which not long ago would have been treated as non-navigable
and thus as immune from the dominant federal power. To justify the no com-
pensation rule by the idea of notice of a paramount federal right in navigable
127. It is interesting to note that some notion of "notice" runs through the cases up-
holding eminent domain and taxing and police powers over contract clause claims. See
Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause (pts. 1-3) 57 Harv. L. Rev. 512, 621,
852 (1944). One example is West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848)
dealing with the reacquisition (under eminent domain power) of previously granted
property: "But into all contracts . . . enter conditions which arise not out of the literal
terms of the contract itself; they are superinduced by .the preexisting and higher author-
ity of the laws of nature . . . they are al'uays presumed, and must be presumed, to be
know.n and recognized by all. . . . Such a condition is the right to eminent domain."
Id. at 532. (Emphasis added.)
128. But see E (3) infra, under Part II, I.
129. As was shown in International Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399 (1931).
130. Nor is that question entirely settled at this date. See for instance Sato, "the
limitation (of the servitude) is not presently subject to precise definition." Sato, supra
note 122, at 46.
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streams would require that navigability be defined as of the time the private right
in question was acquired. The cases make no such distinction. Nor is it likely
that the United States would be estopped in favor of investments made before
federal activity or the concept of navigability had reached their present scope-
before, in other words, there was any meaningful notice. There is the general
reluctance to invoke estoppel against the sovereign. Beyond that, uniformity
would then call for the use of estoppel against the expansion of all constitutionally
granted powers. The proposition seems absurd and in conflict with our basic tenet
of constitutional interpretation.
E. HistoricalAids
There appears then at this point no satisfying explanation for the no com-
pensation rule. The dissatisfaction with the Court's language about a "superior
federal power" rests largely on the simultaneous characterization of that power
as part of the broader commerce power. Yet property taken in exercise of the
commerce power generally would require the payment of compensation. The
dissatisfaction with a notice theory rests largely on the difficulty of finding a
meaningful notice before the inception of the Union and throughout its early his-
tory up to a time of some certainty about the kinds of property subject to destruc-
tion without compensation.
It is here that "a page of history" might well go a long way. This paper lays
no claims to being an historical study of the treatment of navigation by the early
common law. Yet even a superficial glance elucidates what the Court may have in
mind when it speaks of federal "plenary power" or "knowledge" of the superior
right.
The common law attached great importance to two rights of the public in
navigable waters: navigation and fishing.' 3 ' The English definition of navigable
waters differed (and differs today) from the American. 132 The difference is not
131. This paper will give no consideration to fishing rights. They are mentioned
only because public fishing rights in navigable streams were historically considered as
important as navigation.
132. In English law, "navigable" waterways are those in which the tide ebbs and
flows. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661 (1891), under
that rule such rivers as the Po, Nile, Rhine, Danube etc. are non-navigable rivers, while
a small creek might be navigable because near enough to the ocean for the tide to ebb
on it. However, the rule makes sense for England since all rivers of any importance are
subject to the tides there. The totally different situation of the United States led to the
rejection of the English rule first for admiralty jurisdiction and then for navigation con-
trol. See The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851) ; The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S.
(10 Wall.) 557 (1870) ; Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661 (1891) ; Gould § 42 et seq. on the
English rule. American common law originally followed Roman law on the question of
navigability. Roman law (and through it continental law) divided waterways into pub-
lic and private ones. Broadly speaking, public waterways (fluem publicum) were those
that were navigable in fact. There has been much controversy over the exact scope of
the concept of fluern publicum. See Ossig, Roemisches Wasserrecht (1898). However, the
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important. Important rather are certain consequences that attached once a
waterway was considered "navigable."
1. The Law of England1
3 3
Under the law of England, the Crown has the right of property in the arms
and inlets of the sea within the realm. The right also includes tidal rivers-
includes in other words navigable rivers under the English test of navigability.
These rights of the Crown are classed among the regalia or prerogative
rights. Prerogative rights are by the common law accorded to the king as an inci-
dent to the powers of government: for the protection of the realm and in the
interest of commerce. 13 4
De Jure Mars"35 described the Crown's interest in navigable waters as being
of a twofold nature. One was said to be the jus publicum, the right to jurisdiction
and control for the benefit of the subjects. The other was said to be the jus priva-
turn, the right of private property of the Crown, independent of any ownership
of the adjoining lands. The existence of the jus privatum has been much dis-
puted. 1 6 But there has apparently never been any conflict over a number of
other propositions. Foremost of those was the right of the public to free and un-
hindered passage. That right was spoken of as a "natural right," 1 37 a right
"whose origin is lost in antiquity.""' 8 It was, in any event, a right that took
account of the obvious importance of navigable waterways (by whatever defini-
tion) to a developing society. That the rights of the public were limited to navi-
gation and fishing has rather plausibly been explained by their being the only
general uses of which such waterways were in early days supposed to be
capable. 139
Secondly, the public right was paramount to any rights the Crown might have
in navigable waters. Consequently, the Crown could not use its property so as to
derogate navigation. Nor could it invest its grantee with greater power than it
details of that controversy need not concern us here. American law at first adopted the
same test. See The Daniel Ball, supra. The present-day viability of the rule of "navigable
if navigable in fact" has been examined in Part I, II, A supra.
133. The following description of the law of England is for the most part taken from
Gould. But see also Phear, Rights of Water (1859) for valuable insight into English rules.
For English modern law see Coulson & Forbes.
134. See Gould § 20 quoting Bacon: "All prerogatives must be for the advantage and
good of the people; otherwise they ought not to be allowed by law."
135. The 17th century treatise commonly ascribed to Lord Hale.
136. In the course of that conflict Hale's authorship was seriously disputed, mostly
because it lent great weight to the authority of De Jure Marls. See Gould § 18. The con-
flict was finally settled in favor of the existence of a private interest in the Crown, apart
from adjoining lands. Gould § 3.
137. So for example Phear, supra note 133.
138. Coulson & Forbes 507.
139. That at least is Phear's explanation. And see Gould § 1: "The sea is serviceable
for important uses, especially for navigation and fishing."
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itself had. Thus the grantee's property was equally subject to the public right
and he, too, could do nothing in derogation of it. 4'
Thirdly, the right of navigation extended over every part of the navigable
river. All rights necessary for the free and convenient passage of vessels were
incidental to the main right of navigation, although their exercise injured
"private property." 141
Finally, any interference with the paramount right of the public created an
abatable nuisance. 14 2 The king, as conservator and protector of navigation had
jurisdiction to reform and punish such nuisances. 1 43
These were the relevant rules regarding tidal waters. Basically, they have
remained unchanged, "jealously guarding" the right of navigation as a "great
public interest." 14
4
One other development clearly demonstrates the importance of navigation to
the early common law. Under its terminology, only "tide waters" were "navi-
gable waters" that is, "public waters" belonging prima facie to the Crown but
being subject as a matter of "natural right" to the jus publicum of navigation and
fishing. In rivers above the ebb and flow of the sea, title to the soil rested prima
facie in the riparian owners and the right of fishing was private. 145 Nevertheless,
De Jure Mars spoke of the king's jurisdiction to reform and punish nuisances
in all rivers that were a common passage, whether fresh or salt. The treatise
clearly supported the doctrine that the public had a right of navigation in fresh-
water rivers, albeit the only right. After a period of some doubt,146 the present
140. In modern times, any grant by the Crown for uses detrimental to the jus publicur
are void as to such parts open to that objection or fail to divest the Crown and to invest
the grantee. Gould § 21; Coulson & Forbes 517.
141. The case used by both Phear and Gould involves an oyster bed, damaged by a
vessel that had ascended the stream during the tide and then remained aground during
the ebb, awaiting the return of the tide. Again it is emphasized that the property owner
could not interfere with the paramount public right and that any attempt to hinder the
vessel would have created a public nuisance.
142. As opposed to perprestures, a term properly limited to injuries to the jus priva-
turn. Perprestures may or may not also be public nuisances, depending on whether as a
matter of fact there is or is not a violation of the jus publicum,
143. The supervision of navigable waters is entrusted to so-called "conservancies."
One of the earliest conservancies was that of the Thames, established in the mayor and
corporation of London during the reign of Richard II. Coulson & Forbes 552. Because the
jus privatum is subject to the jus publicum, the king cannot license a public nuisance and
such a royal license would not constitute a good defense. Gould § 21.
144. Gould § 91 citing Rex v. Clark, 12 Mod. 615, 88 Eng. Rep. 1558 (1702) and C. J.
Holt's statement that to hinder the course of a navigable river was against Magna Charta.
145. That at least was the rule since the 17th century, laid down in the Case of the
Royal Fishery of the Banne, Davis (Irish) 55, 80 Eng. Rep. 540 (1611). Earlier cases had
left the question in doubt and Bracton, writing in the 13th century, had claimed all rivers
with perpetual flow to be "public" rivers. Gould § 49.
146. The question apparently was still unsettled in 1838. See Gould § 52 quoting C. J.
Lord Denman in Williams v. Wilcox, 8 Ad. & El. 314, 333, 112 Eng. Rep. 857 (1838): "It
is clear that the channels of public navigable rivers were always highways: up to the
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English rule was established. It recognizes the right of navigation in fresh-
water rivers. But it makes that right dependent upon prescription, thus resting
it on grounds different from those of the earlier authorities.' 47 The public right
is said to be an easement to which the title of the riparian owners is subject.
There is, however, a general presumption of an easement and the owner can
neither prevent its acquisition or exercise nor obtain compensation for the sub-
ordination of his private property to the common use.1 48
In effect then, the public has a right of free passage on all waterways capable
of such use, whether in other respects they are private property or not. As the
necessary corollary, neither the Crown nor the adjacent owners may obstruct or
limit that passage. 149
2. Effect on American law-the states
The early English settlements in this country were territories acquired by dis-
covery. Therefore, the rights of the new settlers were determined by the law of
the mother-country. 150 That meant that "navigable streams" were subject to
the public right of navigation. It also meant that here as in England the public
right could not be obstructed or limited either by the Crown or by adjacent
owners. Of course some of the principles of the English common law were
modified in accord with the different circumstances of the new country. Probably
the most important change was the abandonment of the ebb and flow of the
tide as the test for navigability and the adoption of the rule that those streams
were "navigable" which were navigable in fact, be they tidal or fresh-water
streams.' 51 After some early hesitation, American courts furthermore rejected
the rule that navigable fresh-water streams were subject to the public right only
upon a showing of long user.152
point reached by the flow of the tide the soil was presumably in the Crown; and, above
that point, whether the soil at common law was in the Crown or the owners of the adja-
cent lands (a point perhaps not free from doubt), there was at least a jurisdiction in the
Crown, according to Sir Matthew Hale, 'to reform and punish nuisances in all rivers,
whether fresh or salt, that are a common passage, not only for ships and greater vessels,
but also for smaller, as barges or boats.' In either case, the right of the subject to pass up
and down was complete." (Emphasis added.)
147. That is, different from De lure Mars and such cases as the one mentioned in the
preceding footnote. But see Gould § 55 suggesting that as a matter of theory prescription
is the only ground upon which to reconcile navigation with the private ownership of
the soil.
148. It is for these reasons that Gould speaks of the "anomalous nature of this doc-
trine." On the same grounds he rejects the common analogy to the case of a highway on
land, where public use, as he points out, arises by statute (with compensation) or by con-
sent, whether in the form of dedication, contract or prescription. See Gould § 55.
149. Roman law equally reflects the importance with which navigable waterways
were looked upon. There is much controversy whether the "flumina publica" were subject
to state ownership or state sovereignty only. There is no controversy that they were dedi-
cated to the common use, whether as res publicae in publico usu or as res nullius. The
most important form of the common use was navigation, which was preferred over all
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Finally, the idea of a jus privalum or private property right of the Crown
to the shores of the sea and tidal waters never found acceptance in this coun-
try. 15 3 The revolution therefore vested in the succeeding states the jus publicum
only. That is, dominion over navigable waters (however defined) vested prima
facie in the respective states. But such state "ownership" was for the public
benefit and the power acquired by the succession was no more than that which
the king could have exercised before the revolution. 5 4 The change in dominion
thus did not affect or impair the right of the public. Nor was the public right
destroyed where states in their sovereign capacity created property rights in the
soil of navigable streams in favor of abutting owners. 15 5 Again the private
grantee could have no greater rights than his grantor-state. Thus his private
property remained subject to the public right of navigation. The states were in
no way disabled from interfering with such private property by legislation
other uses. It was the only use protected against interference by a private interdict.
Roman law prohibited all uses that would change the flow of the stream, as for instance
diversions. Roman law further prohibited (and protected by prohibition as well as by
restitutionary popular interdicts) all uses that would prevent navigation, make it more
difficult, diminish it or shorten the period of time during which it was normally possible.
Especially it prohibited any use that would result in a lowering of the waterlevel and thus
endanger navigability. See Ossig, Roemisches Wasserrecht (1898) at 98-120.
150. As opposed to territories acquired by conquest, in which the conqueror may estab-
lish any rule of law he likes. See Gould § 30.
151. See also The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870) discussed supra.
152. See Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9, 21, 50 Am. Dec. 641 (1849): "If a stream
could be subject to public servitude, by long use only, many large rivers in newly settled
States ... would be altogether under the control and dominion of the owners of their beds,
and the community would be deprived of the use of those rivers, which nature has plainly
declared to be public highways. The true test, therefore, to be applied in such cases, is,
whether a stream is inherently and in its nature, capable of being used for the purposes
of commerce .... When a stream possesses such a character, then the easement exists,
leaving to the owners of the bed, all other modes of use not inconsistent with it." And see
Gould §§ 53-54.
153. See Gould § 32. The jus privatum had been a controversial theory in England as
well, see note 136 supra.
154. But note that Parliament had power to legalize encroachments which are for the
benefit of navigation. See Gould § 21. Similarly, the states may sanction an encroachment
on the public right, provided intercourse between different states is not thereby affected.
See Gould § 35. As for the "new states" their source of "title" is the United States. The
principle of equality among the states entitled the new states upon their admission to the
rights and privileges possessed by the original states. See also Library of Congress Leg-
islative Reference Service. The Constitution of the United States of America 130 (Corwin
ed. 1952) : "By a long-standing doctrine of Constitutional Law the States possess dominion
over the beds of all navigable streams within their borders" citing to Pollard v. Hagan,
44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845) and the statement there contained that "the new States have
the same rights, sovereignty and jurisdiction over this subject as the original States."
155. In Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876) Mr. Justice Bradley charged that the
early confusion in this country between "navigable" and "tide" waters led the states to
"resign" to riparian proprietor's rights which properly belonged to the states in their sov-
ereign capacity. But the Supreme Court has never sought to interfere with the right of
each state to fashion its rules of property.
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regulating or preserving navigation. Such interference is not a taking, for the
private right had from its creation been impressed with the public right.156
3. Effect on American law-the federal government
The creation of the federal sovereign in no way changed the public right
of navigation. On the contrary, its protection and preservation had thereby
become a matter of national control.' 5 7 By definition, the continued right of
the public to free passage on its navigable streams had to be accompanied by the
continued subjection of any private rights in such waters to the public right.
Furthermore, the states had to yield where the federal government exercised
its power to regulate the "navigable streams of the United States," 158 to protect,
in other words, the right of navigation in the interest of all its citizens. The
power of the federal government to do so is "superior." That superiority ex-
plains why lesser rights have to yield. It does not explain why they have to yield
without compensation, as has been pointed out earlier. The historical notion of
the paramount right of the community to navigate and fish its navigable water-
ways free from any interference does explain it. Even the king could do nothing
to abridge that right, let alone his grantee. Whatever made up the bundle of
"property rights" in navigable streams, the impairment of navigation was not
part of the bundle. The "superior" federal right serves to maintain the "superior"
public right.
Perhaps all of this is implied when the Supreme Court speaks of the "domi-
nant" or the "paramount" or the "superior" federal right. Certainly it ought
to be implied. Historical considerations also lend some support to the "notice
theory" discussed earlier. If the settlers indeed brought with them the law of
156. For this reason Lewis does not think the question of title to the bed of the stream
is important. He divides navigable streams into private navigable streams and public
navigable streams, with title in the latter being in the public. Such is the case for instance
in Pennsylvania. If title is in the public, it is held in trust for the public use. If title is in
the riparian owner, again it is subject to the exercise of the public rights of navigation
and fishing. According to Lewis, any damage to a riparian owner on a public stream not
caused by purposes connected with these public rights constitutes a compensable taking.
He admits, however, that the decisions on this point in states where navigable streams
are public streams are adverse to his view. The question of title therefore does assume
importance if the problem arises outside the navigation (or fishing) context. For our pur-
poses it may be indeed be ignored. 1 Lewis, Eminent Domain § 94 et seq. (3d ed. 1909).
157. See Gibbsons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824). The states, however, are not
per se pre-empted from exercising their sovereign rights over navigable streams within
their borders. At least since Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865) there
has been little doubt that "in the absence of conflicting legislation by Congress States were
entitled to enact legislation adapted to the local needs of interstate and foreign com-
merce...." Corwin, note 154 supra, at 229, discussing Gibbons v. Ogden, Willson v. Black-
bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829) and Cooley v. Board of Wardens,
53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). Corwin adds that the states must use this power "reason-
ably"-thus perhaps indicating that no undue burden may be imposed on interstate com-
merce under general commerce clause principles even absent congressional action.
158. See Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865).
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England, then they brought with them knowledge of the fact that "navigable"
streams were subject to the public right. There could be no doubt regarding tidal
waters. There could be some doubt regarding fresh waters. Until navigability
was defined as navigability in fact, use of fresh waters by the public could be
thought to depend on an easement by prescription. But the distinction between
tidal and fresh waters was eliminated early. And even in England the easement
was presumed and its acquisition could not be prevented. 15 9 For all practical pur-
poses, therefore, there could be no doubt over the status of private rights in fresh
waters.
Nevertheless, the objections voiced earlier against the notice theory remain.
Congressional activity in the name of navigation has expanded-as has the con-
cept of navigable streams. The cases have not taken account of either develop-
ment and its respective effects on notice.
For that matter, the cases take little account of the origin of the rule of no
compensation. The rule has perpetuated itself from the days when free use of the
waterways was an absolute necessity for the survival of the community. In many
instances waterways undoubtedly were the only adequate, important arteries of
commerce. Today there are others, equally important. A choice between two
courses of conduct seems to exist: extend the rule of no compensation to all
arteries of commerce on the basis of their supreme importance to the welfare
of the nation, or have the community as a whole bear the cost of "free and
unhindered passage." It is of doubtful propriety to rationalize the continued
preference of waterways on the basis of reasons that are no longer applicable.
However, the full sweep of that preferential treatment is yet to be examined.
Perhaps it is best therefore to postpone further evaluation of the no compensation
rule until the end of this article.
II
CONSEQUENCES TO PRIVATE PROPERTY1 6 0
A. Introduction
In speaking thus far of the rule of no compensation, it has merely been
said that it applies to "certain" private property rights. No attempt has been
made to ascertain what these rights are with any degree of accuracy. The fol-
lowing investigation makes that attempt.' 6 ' For purposes of analysis, the cases
to be discussed have been divided into three categories.
159. See text following note 147 supra.
160. See also Powell, Just Compensation and the Navigation Power, 31 Wash. L. Rev.
271 (1956) ; Sato, Water Resources-Comments upon the Federal-State Relationship, 48
Calif. L. Rev. 43 (1960) ; Comment, 55 Mich. L. Rev. 272 (1956) ; Note, 13 Mont. L. Rev.
102 (1952).
161. As has been pointed out earlier, some of the cases (especially the earlier ones)
to be examined here are explainable as involving non-compensable injury incident to a
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(I) The United States prevents or burdens the use of a navigable river, its
flow or its bed.
(2) The United States raises the stream level of the navigable mainstream.
Damage results to private property (a) situated on the navigable mainstream;
(b) situated on a non-navigable tributary.
(3) The United States condemns land abutting (a) on a navigable stream;
(b) on a non-navigable stream. The owner claims compensation for its special
location or site value.162
B. The United States Prevents Or Burdens The Use Of A Navigable River,
Its Flow Or Its Bed
The discussion proper of the kinds of property rights.subject to the rule of
no compensation begins with an anti-climax. Monongahela Nay. Co. v.
United States,1' 3 the first compensation case to reach the Court, made the United
States pay for the value of a toll-collecting franchise in the Monongahela River.
Under the commerce clause, Congress was said to have the power to appropriate
the owner's locks and dam. By the same token, the power was said to be subject
to the fifth amendment. In view of the already then accepted idea of navigation
as the historically paramount public right, Monongahela was erroneously decided.
For by making the United States pay for the intangible value of the franchise,
the Court gave recognition to a "property right" dependent on the use of the
river. The Court later repeatedly distiguished Monongahela as having rested
on estoppel, namely that the locks and the dam had been constructed at the
"instance and implied invitation" of Congress.16 4 There would be no reason to
resurrect it, had not the Court recently referred to it, although it is unclear to
what avail.' 65
lawful exercise of the regulatory power rather than "unique" navigation servitude rules.
They are discussed here because this chapter brings together most of the cases in which
the navigation servitude plays a part-albeit the denial of compensation in some of the
cases is not unique; because the Court at times used the "consequential injury" approach
merely as an alternative basis for decision; and because all the cases have bearing on the
question ultimately to be examined, namely the compensability of irrigation water rights.
162. United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229 (1960) will be treated
separately. Its importance for the more particular inquiry of this paper merits such high-
lighting.
It should further be noted that the compensation problem in these cases arises in two
different contexts. One is a specific congressional enactment covering particular projects.
The other is suits brought under the Rivers and Harbors Act. Both groups are included
in the discussion without attempt at separation.
163. 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
164. See United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 (1943) ; Omnia Co. v.
United States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923) ; Lewis Blue Point Oyster Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82
(1913).
165. United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 631 (1961) citing
Monongahela for the notion that the word "just" in the fifth amendment evokes "ideas
of fairness and equity."
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Gibson v. United States 6 first translated the paramount nature of the
federal power to protect navigation into federal immunity against compensa-
tion. No compensation was held to be available where access to the navigable
Ohio was cut off by the construction of a federal dike. The Court gave two
reasons. One, the loss of access was said to be an "incidental consequence" of the
lawful exercise of a governmental power rather than a "taking" of property and
thus not compensable under eminent domain principles. Two, the Court rested
its decision on the obligation of riparian ownership "to suffer the consequences
of improvement of navigation in the exercise of the dominant right of the govern-
ment." 167 Any damages were therefore the result of the exercise of the servitude
"to which [the] property had always been subject." '6 8
More recently, United States v. Commodore Park'69 affirmed the principle
of the access cases. The issue arose when a navigable bay was dredged. One of
its arms was used as a deposit place for the dredged materials, thus destroying
its navigability. Compensation was claimed for the resulting decrease in market
value of the abutting land, although there had been no physical invasion. Pre-
dictably enough, the Supreme Court denied to the riparian owner "a unique
private right distinct from that held by all others, to have access to and enjoyment
of navigable waters and to recover compensation because deprived of that
privilege."' 170 Nor was that rule inapplicable because the United States had
destroyed navigability-"there is power to block navigation at one place to
foster it at another." 171
In United States v. Bellingham Bay Boom Co.172 an injunction was sought
for the removal, as an obstruction to navigation, of a boom constructed across
the Nooksack River in Washington, held by the Court to be navigable. 1 73 Suit
was brought under section 10 of the 1890 Act, prohibiting "[T]he creation of any
obstruction, not affirmatively authorized by law, to the navigable capacity of any
waters [of] . . . the United States."1 74 The boom had been constructed prior
to 1890 under authority of the state legislature. Reading "authorized by law"
to include state law, the Supreme Court held the boom to be authorized, if it
166. 166 U.S. 269 (1897).
167. Id. at 276.
168. Id. at 276. See also Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900) another "access"
case. Again the Court spoke of a consequential injury to a right which must be enjoyed
"in due subjection" to the rights of the public.
169. 324 U.S. 386 (1945).
170. Id. at 390.
171. Id. at 393.
172. 176 U.S. 211 (1900).
173. Although the river was located entirely within Washington it came under fed-
eral jurisdiction because it emptied into a bay and thence into the Pacific. This, inciden-
tally, destroys one justification offered for the result in United States v. Gerlach Live
Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950), namely that the San Joaquin is not a navigable stream
"of the United States." See Note, 13 Mont. L. Rev. 102, 109 (1952).
174. Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 907, § 10, 26 Stat. 454.
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conformed to the state statute. 175 Nevertheless, the United States could order
the abatement of the obstruction, but only upon payment of compensation, citing
Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United States.176 Again recognition was given
to the presumably erroneous notion that private rights good against paramount
federal power could vest in the use of the nation's waterways. 177
Recognition of the error may have been the reason why the next "bridge
case" did not mention the Bellingham decision. In Union Bridge Co. v. United
States"78 the Secretary of War 179 found the bridge to be an unreasonable ob-
struction to the navigation of the Allegheny River and demanded that changes
be made. Construction of the bridge had been authorized in 1873 by an act of
the Pennsylvania legislature. The case arose under the 1899 enactment of the
Rivers and Harbors Act. The major thrust of the Bridge Company's argument
centered on the constitutionality of the failure to provide compensation, here for
the amounts necessary to comply with the required changes.' 80 On the basis of
the "access" cases, 181 the Court held there was no "taking" but only "incidental"
damage.
The result of the Union Bridge case was far from startling.'8 2 But Mr.
Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court made a number of points worth con-
sidering. It rejected once and for all the efficacy of state sanction-a result written
into section 10 by the 1899 enactment.18 It also posited the possibility that the
bridge, when erected, was not an "obstruction to navigation as then carried
175. Apparently the Court overlooked that it had only one year earlier construed sec-
tion 10 to require national assent. See United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co.,
174 U.S. 690, 708 (1899). The 1899 enactment clarified section 10 by substituting the
words "not affirmatively authorized by Congress." Act of March 3, 1899, ch. 425, § 10,
30 Stat. 1151. (Emphasis added.)
176. 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
177. At least that was the principle stated by the Court. It went on to find non-con-
formance of the boom with state regulations. As an "illegal" obstruction it could therefore
be removed without compensation.
178. 204 U.S. 364 (1907).
179. That was the official entrusted with the administration of the Rivers and Har-
bors Act. The title of the office was later changed to Secretary of the Army. Act of July 26,
1947, ch. 343, § 205, 61 Stat. 501.
180. The Court also considered (and rejected) the argument that the act contained
an unconstitutional delegation of congressional power.by authorizing the Secretary of
War to order changes whenever he had reason to believe a bridge to constitute an
unreasonable obstruction to navigation.
181. Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900) ; Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269
(1897).
182. Nor was it "unique"-that is, non-compensability here seems more an example
of the "regulation cases" than of the applicability of the navigation servitude to otherwise
compensable private rights.
183. See note 175 supra. This may also explain why the Court felt it unnecessary to
mention United States v. Bellingham Bay Boom Co., 176 U.S. 211 (1900).
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on.
" 184 The Court made clear that that circumstance would not have altered
its decision. The company constructed the bridge
with knowledge of the paramount authority of Congress . .. [and]
subject to the possibility that Congress might, at some future time,
when the public interest demanded, exert its power by appropriate
legislation to protect navigation against unreasonable obstructions. 85
Finally, the Court posited the possibility that the bridge had been an unrea-
sonable obstruction from its erection. That, too, would not have changed the
decision. No obligation accrues to Congress to pay compensation now because
of its earlier inaction.
The opinion thus gives expression to the idea of notice as justifying non-
compensability. But it makes clear that neither a change in the mode of navigation
nor congressional inaction calls for a deviation from the rule. The result could
be rationalized by incorporating into the idea of notice an element of futurity,
i.e., there is notice of the paramount power and of its future exercise under
changed conditions. On the other hand, this extension of an already questionable
rationale seems merely another way of disallowing the sovereign to be estopped.
Nor is there reason to assume that the Court would react differently if the
problem concerned changing concepts of navigability rather than navigation.
The Court dealt expressly with the estoppel issue in Louisville Bridge Co. v.
United States, 86 almost identical to the Union Bridge case. This time, however,
the bridge was built under congressional rather than state authorization. The
Court nevertheless held that the authorization conferred no irrepealable fran-
chise and no "vested right" requiring compensation for changes subsequently
found necessary in the interest of navigation. The injection of the Monogahela
case 1 7 raised the question of estoppel. Theoretically, the Court did not fore-
close its application altogether: "We need not go so far as to say that Congress
could not [be estopped] . .. from [changing] .. . a regulation once made,"
but it was quick to add that "grants of special franchises and privileges are to be
strictly construed in favor of the public right. .... "s188
In the course of its opinion, the Court suggested that perhaps it might be
assumed that the parties foresaw eventual obsolescence. Hence they might have
184. 204 U.S. 364,400 (1907). (All italicized in original.)
185. Id. at 400.
186. 242 U.S. 409 (1917).
187. Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893). It was distin-
guished as involving an "actual taking over" of property.
188. 242 U.S. 409, 417 (1917). The principle of strict construction of franchises is far
from being unique to the navigation power. See the contract clause cases beginning with
The Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36
U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
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conducted their business in such a manner as to recoup their investment during
that period. The argument is appealing that one making use of a navigable
river and having full knowledge of the paramount right can recoup his invest-
ment by the exercise of some business foresight. It almost establishes the fairness
of the no compensation rule. Unfortunately, it is practically illusory. The advent
of obsolescence may in no way coincide with the development of new modes of
navigation, converting the given structure into an "obstruction." And the most
perspicacious of business judgments would have difficulty harmonizing the length
of the recoupment period with the point in time at which Congress might decide
to appropriate the entire flow of the river. The argument makes sense only if
the federal authorization were to carry with it some guarantee of an estimated
recoupment period. This could be achieved either by. assuring no federal inter-
vention for that period, or, that being a very impractical proposition, by allowing
federal intervention during the period only upon payment of compensation.
Even this solution would not help those whose use of the stream presumably re-
quires no federal authorization under any of the present provisions of the Rivers
and Harbors Act.
In the meantime, the no compensation rule had pursued its course in still
another direction. The occasion was United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water
Power Co.1' 9 The case involved a condemnation proceeding for a power plant
as well as uplands, instituted by the United States under a specific act of Con-
gress appropriating the entire flow of the St. Mary's River. 190 There was no
review of the congressional determination that the entire flow of the river should
be appropriated and kept free for the use of navigation. If structures placed in the
river were obstructing navigation, Congress could "require their removal and
forbid the use of the bed of the river by the owner in any way which in its
judgment is injurious to the dominant right of navigation."'' The license
which Chandler-Dunbar had procured for its plant was a mere "revocable per-
mission ;" that Chandler-Dunbar "did not thereby acquire any right to maintain
these constructions in the river longer than the government should continue the
license, needs no argument." 192 Furthermore, the company knew that the permit
was likely to be revoked at any time. Thus there was nothing in the facts "which
savors of estoppel in law or equity." 193
The decision as to the plant itself merely carried out what had been implied
189. 229 U.S. 53 (1913). The case will also be discussed as a problem of the valuation
of abutting land, with a different formulation of the issue it presents.
190. Act of March 3, 1909, ch. 264, 35 Stat. 815. The relevant sections are set forth in
note 1 of the Court's opinion.
191. 229 U.S. 53, 62 (1913).
192. Id. at 68. The inefficacy of a federal license was reaffirmed in Louisville Bridge
Co. v. United States, 242 U.S. 409 (1917). See text at note 186 supra.
193. 229 U.S. 53, 68 (1913).
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by Mr. Justice Harlan in the Union Bridge decision. 5 4 The Court faced a new
question in the water power capacity of certain rapids. In the court below, that
claim had resulted in an award for the value of "raw water," i.e., the present
money value of the rapids to the company as riparian owners.1"5 The Supreme
Court sustained the exception of the United States.
First of all, Chandler-Dunbar had no longer any right to place in the river
the structures necessary for the commercial exploitation of the water power.
Aside from that, the award could only be based on the erroneous hypothesis of a
private property interest in the water power of the river.
Ownership of a private stream wholly upon lands of an individual
is conceivable; but that the running water in a great navigable stream
is capable of private ownership is inconceivable.'
The use of the word "ownership" has brought forth the charge that the Court
confused it with jurisdiction. One writer has asserted that any implication "that
there can be no usufructuary water rights in a navigable stream . . . is mis-
chievously wrong." 197 But with one qualification that is precisely the implication
of Chandler-Dunbar. The qualification is that the non-recognition of private
usufructuary rights is limited to the relationship between the owner and the
national government in the exercise of the navigation power. 198 Within that
relationship, whatever rights exists, exist by the grace of Congress. They are not
of the kind to be compensable upon their destruction or impairment. Their
characterization seems irrelevant. "Ownership" of navigable waters may indeed
be beside the point' 9 9 -the subjection of usufructuary rights to the paramount
federal power is not. Nor has the Court deviated from that rule absent an
indication by Congress that it meant for such rights te be treated differently.2 0 0
194. Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907). See text at note 178
supra.
195. The award below also had included an element of value contributed by the
uplands "for lock and canal purposes." 229 U.S. 53, 75 (1913). The propriety of this
award is discussed in Part II, II, D, (1) infra.
196. 229 U.S. 53, 69 (1913).
197. Corker, Water Rights and Federalism-The Western Water Rights Settlement
Bill of 1957,45 Calif. L. Rev. 604, 616 (1957).
198. As opposed to claims of stream-users inter sese, where full recognition would be
given a state-created private usufructuary right.
199. See Corker, supra note 197, at 616.
200. The Corker article, supra note 197, cites four cases as support for the assertion
that "rights in navigable waters have often been recognized," namely: FPC v. Niagara
Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239 (1954) ; United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co.,
339 U.S. 725 (1950) ; Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co. v. Patten Paper Co., 172 U.S. 58
(1898) ; and Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
The Niagara Mohawk case did so as a matter of statutory interpretation, concluding
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Following Chandler-Dunbar, other cases strengthened and reaffirmed the
principles on which it was based.
Thus, the Court held in Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs201
that no compensation could be had for the destruction of an oyster bed incident
to the dredging of lands underlying Great South Bay in New York. The title to
such lands is "defeasible" by the exercise of the power.
Nor did the plaintiff in Greenleaf Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison20 2 succeed
in obtaining compensation for the removal of wharves located within a harbor
line subsequently established by the Secretary of War. It was again irrelevant that
the wharves, when constructed, conformed to the harbor lines as then located
by Virginia and the United States. The company's attempted distinction be-
tween structures that availed of the river's navigability and those that hindered
it, failed to overcome the conclusive congressional judgment as to what was or
was not an obstruction of navigation.
A subsequent change of harbor lines in the Savannah River prevented the
claimant in Willink v. United States203 from renewing wharves and pilings
needed to conduct his ship-repair business. His loss in earnings was non-com-
pensable. The decision is important because it contains one of the early pro-
nouncements on the physical boundaries of the servitude. Since the river was
navigable, the Court reasoned, claimant's rights in the land "below the mean
high-water line were subordinate to the . . . power of Congress. °2 0 4 And
since the structures in question were located below that line, Congress could
"prevent their renewal without . . . compensation therefore." 205 Although the
that although the water rights concerned were within the servitude, the Federal Water
Power Act did not mean to exercise that servitude and abolish them.
Gerlach Live Stock Co. similarly based its result on the Reclamation Act, expressly
leaving open the constitutional question.
Green Bay involved a controversy between two companies seeking an adjudication
as to what proportion of the flow of the river should be permitted to flow in its several
channels. The federal question arose by way of a cross-complaint asserting right and
title to water power under the United States. It has no bearing on the question of com-
pensability of private usufructuary rights upon an exercise of the navigation power by
Congress.
As to Monongahela, it is difficult to treat it other than as overruled or, at the very best,
as resting on estoppel.
Not mentioned in the Corker article is Henry Ford & Son v. Little Falls Fibre Co.,
280 U.S. 369 (1930) requiring the federal licensee of a power project to pay compensation
when his flashboards caused the reduction of claimant's operating head. But again the
case turned on the construction of the Federal Water Power Act.
201. 229 U.S. 82 (1913) (the work was undertaken pursuant to a special act of
Congress).
202. 237 U.S. 251 (1915) (suit against the Secretary of War acting under the Rivers
and Harbors Act).
203. 24-0 U.S. 572 (1916) (Secretary of War acting under the Rivers and Harbors
Act).
204. Id. at 580. (Emphasis added.)
205. Id. at 580.
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Court made no mention of it, its analysis and resulting conclusion seem in
conflict with United States v. Lynah,2° 6 to be discussed presently.
C. The United States Raises The Level Of The Navigable Mainstream,
Damaging Private Property
The cases in the next two subsections raise questions about the physical boun-
daries of the navigation servitude. None of the prior cases needed to concern
themselves with that determination. The private rights claimed in them were
rights to use of the stream itself, or to its flow or its bed.2 0 7 Within those limits
it had always been clear that the public right of passage superseded the private
right. The prior cases have one other thing in common. They all deal with the
stream in its natural condition; in none of them had the United States attempted
to alter its level. Again it had been clear since the early common law that the
public rights of navigation and fishery extended to the line marked by the
ordinary or neap tides of tidal waters 208 and the ordinary high-water mark of
fresh waters.20 9 The ordinary high-water mark was also the limit of the public
right in the United States.210 Not clear was the power of the United States to
maintain a navigable stream artificially, by means of dams, at its ordinary high-
water level. That of course results in covering the strip of soil located between
the ordinary low and high-water marks permanently. Absent a dam maintaining
the river at the ordinary high-water mark, that strip is not covered permanently.
Thus it is available to the owner for such use as he may be able to make of it.
Under the circumstances, the use will be a limited one. But that alone obviously
does not determine its non-compensability in the event of a taking.
206. 188 U.S. 445 (1903).
207. Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897) (access) ; Louisville Bridge Co. v.
United States, 242 U.S. 409 (1917); Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364
(1907) (bridges across navigable streams) ; United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water
Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913) (power plant in river) ; Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultiva-
tion Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913) (oyster bed) ; Willink v. United States, 240 U.S.
572 (1916) ; Greenleaf Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251 (1915) (wharves
and pilings in river).
208. See Gould § 27 referring to Hale who mentioned three kinds of tides as giving
rise to three kinds of shores: (1) high spring tides which happen at the two equinoctials;
(2) spring tides which happen twice every month and (3) ordinary or neap tides which
happen twice in 24 hours. Hale concluded that the rights of the sovereign and the public
extended only to the line reached by the ordinary tides.
209. "The low-water mark is the point to which the river recedes at its lowest stage.
The high-water mark is the line which the river impresses upon the soil by covering it
for sufficient periods to deprive it of vegetation. " Gould § 45. See Howard v. Inger-
soll, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 381,417 (1851).
210. See Willink v. United States, 240 U.S. 572 (1916) where claimant's rights in the
land below the mean high-water line were said to be subject to the public right. That of
course is merely the corollary of the rule that the public right extends up to the mean
high-water mark. Note that the Court seems to use the terms "ordinary" and "mean"
interchangeably.
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The following cases then deal with claims made for the alleged taking of
private property due to a change in the stream level, brought about by the
United States.
1. The property is situated along a navigable stream
Only two cases have dealt with the problem. In United States . Lynah 21 1
the government dam raised the level of the Savannah River. The claimant used
the land between the high and low water marks for the cultivation of rice. The
land was protected from the river by an embankment and drained by means of
trunks equipped with floodgates. The outer opening of the trunks was approxi-
mately one foot above the ordinary low water level. The government dam
permanently raised the river level above that point. Drainage thus became
impossible and the area unfit for cultivation.
There was no dispute about the facts up to this point. There was dispute
whether the findings of fact supported the contention that the dam also caused
the water to go over the embankment and flood the land.212 The Court in any
event treated Lynah as a case of flooding. 213 Such flooding was considered a
taking within the fifth amendment notwithstanding that that which was done
was done in exercise of the power to improve navigation, 214 and notwithstanding
further that the land in question was located below the high-water mark.2 15
Thus the decision gave the owner a right in the unchanged level of the water
within its natural banks. Such a private property is irreconcilable with the "para-
mount" public right of navigation, extending up to the ordinary high-water
mark. It should make no difference that the water is artificially maintained at
that level. 2 16
211. 188 U.S.445 (1903).
212. The Court's opinion is not clear on this point. The dissenting Justices White,
Fuller and Harlan read the findings as showing the damage to be due solely to the inter-
ference with drainage, caused by raising the "mean low tide."
213. It was on this basis that the Court one year later distinguished Bedford v. United
States, 192 U.S. 217 (1904). In Bedford, the United States constructed revetments along
the banks of the Mississippi to prevent erosion. As a result, the claimant's land was
eventually eroded. The Court refused compensation. It distinguished Lynah as having
involved an "actual invasion and appropriation of land as distinguished from conse-
quential damage." Id. at 225.
214. United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 471 (1903).
215. The fifth finding of law stated that the land was located between high and low
water marks. Id. at 448-49.
216. The difference between the river in its "natural" condition and in its "artificial"
condition was to trouble the Court again in United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917),
discussed infra. It may also be responsible for the decision in the Willink case, where a
change in harbor lines prevented the claimant from renewing his wharves. The claim-
ant's loss was non-compensable because rights in the land "below the mean high-water
line were subordinate to the public right of navigation." Willink v. United States, 240
U.S. 572, 580 (1916). On its face, the decision conflicts with Lynah, unless it is to be dis-
tinguished because in Willink the United States did nothing to alter the natural condition
of the stream.
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A considerable time later, United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R. R.217
so held. The government dam here had raised the level of the Mississippi
River.218 At issue before the Court was the compensability of that part of the
embankment which was located between high and low water marks. Again the
attempt was made to confine the government to the "natural" condition of the
stream, limiting it to "constructing channels for actual use or . . . removing ob-
structions to navigation." 21 9 The Lynah case was said to call for compensation
where the improvement took the form of raising the level of the stream.
But the Court refused to perpetuate any distinction between "natural" and
"artificial" conditions. It accepted instead the government's contention that its
power
embraces the exercise of every appropriate means for the improvement
of navigable capacity; and that, in the provision of any such means,
it is entitled to deal with and alter the level of the stream to any extent
up to ordinary high-water mark without being answerable to riparian
owners for injury . . . below that line. 220
The servitude was said to extend "to the entire bed of a stream, which includes
the lands below ordinary high-water mark." 22' United States v. Lynah was
expressly overruled. 222
At least for navigable streams, therefore, the rule seems simple enough. The
servitude extends over the bed of the stream up to the ordinary high-water
mark. The United States can permanently raise the stream to that level. If it
injures the claimant's property, that lying below the ordinary high-water mark
is not "taken," i.e., not compensable; that lying above the ordinary high-water
mark is "taken," i.e., compensable. 22 3
2. The property is situated along a non-navigable stream
The Chicago case did not decide the compensability of property adjoining a
217. 312 U.S. 592 (1941).
218. Actually, the water level was raised above the ordinary high-water mark. The
government had conceded compensability of that part of the embankment which was
located above the high-water mark.
219. 312 U.S. 592, 597 (1941).
220. Id. at 595. (Emphasis added.)
221. Id. at 597.
222. Id. at 598. More accurately perhaps, the Court held Lynah to be in "irreconcila-
ble conflict" with its later decisions so far as it sanctioned compensation for injury to
riparian property in the bed of a navigable stream. Lynah had also been cited as author-
ity for the doctrine that a taking of property for public use gives rise to an implied prom-
ise to pay compensation.
223. This conclusion once more demonstrates that a general statement that the exer-
cise of the navigation power inevitably invokes a no-compensation rule for all property
affected would be inaccurate.
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non-navigable tributary and injured by improvements on the navigable main-
stream. However, the Court had dealt with that question earlier, in United
States v. Cress.22 4 The government dam was again constructed on the navigable
stream, thereby raising its level to the ordinary high-water mark. The resulting
backflow at the same time raised the level of a non-navigable tributary. Two
independent claims were raised by two riparian owners located on the non-
navigable tributary. The Court combined the two cases since it considered the
claims identical in nature and calling for the same rule. 225
In the first case, 226 the dam caused frequent overflow of plaintiff's (tributary)
riparian land, depreciating its value. In the second case,227 the dam prevented the
operation of a mill located on the non-navigable tributary by destroying the drop
necessary to run the mill. No part of the mill or the land of this plaintiff were
overflowed.
The Court granted compensation for both claims. The property "taken" was
that which "was unaffected by the flow of the rivers or their tributaries prior to
the construction of the locks."' 228 Since the rule of the Cress case has retained
its validity,229 a detailed examination of the Court's analysis seems justified.
One year before the Cress case, the Court had decided Willink v. United
States.230 It had spoken of the servitude as subjecting all rights "below the mean
high-water line . . . to the . .. power of Congress. ' 28 ' Therefore, the issue
in the Cress case properly framed should have been: Does the "mean high-
water line" rule extend the servitude to all property, regardless of its location,
which will be affected by raising the navigable mainstream to that level? Or
is the rule to be limited to property adjoining the navigable mainstream, all
other property being compensable? Instead, the Court took its approach from
United States v. Lynah.23 2 That, however, seemed to turn on the fact that the
United States, in improving navigability, had not limited itself to clearing away
obstructions or the like, but had raised the level of the river.2 33 In effect, the
Lynah case had sanctioned a right to the unchanged flow of the river. United
States v. Cress did the same.234 The Court recognized the general rule which
224. 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
225. Id. at 317.
226. Case No. 84, id. at 318.
227. Case No. 718, id. at 318-19.
228. Id. at 327. (Emphasis added.)
229. See the discussion in connection with United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co.,
339 U.S. 799 (1950), infra.
230. 240 U.S. 572 (1916). Cress was decided in 1917.
231. Id. at 580.
232. 188 U.S. 445 (1903).
233. The opinion in the Lynah case contains no clear enunciation of that doctrine.
However, the case has been understood that way. That becomes clear from its discussion
in the Chicago case, the case which abolished the distinction between the "natural" and
the "improved" condition. See text at note 217 supra.
234. 243 U.S. 316, 321 (1917), citing, inter alia, to the Willink case.
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subjects private ownership in navigable streams to the public right of navi-
gation. It then spoke of the limits of the rule and of the necessity "to ascertain
the dividing line between public and private right[s]" in navigable waters.2 5
In the Court's view, the public right of navigation was limited to the stream
in its "natural condition."
[I] t has become well established that the test of navigability in fact is
to be applied to the stream in its natural condition, not as artificially
raised by dams or similar structures; that the public right is to be
measured by the capacity of the stream for valuable public use in its
natural condition; that riparian owners have a right to the enjoyment
of the natural flow without burden or hindrance imposed by artificial
means, and no public easement beyond the natural one can arise with-
out grant or dedication save by condemnation with appropriate com-
pensation for the private right.28 6
The servitude was for one, then, limited to streams navigable in fact in their
ordinary condition. That was not a new proposition, however. But for another,
the servitude was now also said to be "confined to the natural condition of the
stream.
' ' 2a 7
The Court supported its conclusion, inter alia, with The Daniel Ball.23 s
That case was said to have "held in effect" that the test of navigability in fact
should be applied to streams in their natural condition. The Daniel Ball is not
a convincing precedent. It sought to establish a concept of navigability more
appropriate for conditions in this country than the rule of the flow and ebb of
the tide.239 It did not define the measure or the limit of the public right of navi-
gation, let alone make it commensurate with the natural condition of the stream,
or talk about compensation.2 40
235. Id. at 321.
236. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
237. Id. at 326.
238. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870). It also cited Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 166 (1871), where a state dam flooded the claimant's land. According to
Cress, "The raising of the river above its natural stage, by means of an artificial struc-
ture, was the gravamen of the complaint." United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 324-25
(1917). (All italicized in original.) United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903), was said
to have followed the same principle. The Lynah case had indeed discussed Pumpelly.
But it should be noted that Pumpelly as well as Lynah did not really discuss the problem
of "natural" versus "artificial" (or improved) condition. Both courts were troubled by
the question whether there could be a "taking" where there was physical invasion yet no
"absolute conversion" of title. To that extent, neither case dealt adequately with the im-
pact of the navigation power on the question of a taking.
239. That of course was the English common law test, navigable in England being
synonymous with tidal. The question here raised should not be confused with that in
United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940), namely whether
a stream can be made subject to federal control by "improving it into" a navigable stream.
240. Nor did other cases decided before Cress support the Court's conclusion. That
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But whatever the validity of the Court's analysis, its basis was destroyed in
United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R. R.24' The Cress case turned on
the distinction between the "natural" and the "artificial" condition of the stream.
The Chicago case eliminated that distinction and recognized the federal power
"to deal with and alter the level of the stream .. . up to [the] ordinary high-
water mark."'2 42 Of course, Chicago still did not decide whether the rule in-
cluded tributaries as far as affected or whether it was limited to the navigable
mainstream. But neither did Cress analyze that situation. Instead, Cress inquired
into navigability, concluding that just as the public right was limited to streams
navigable in their natural condition, so it was limited to the natural condition
of such a stream. That the damage had occurred on a non-navigable tributary
did not, for this approach, constitute a material fact.
Regrettably, the Chicago case paid no heed to the manner in which the Cress
decision had been reached. It contented itself with "confining" Cress to its facts.
Thus the rule of the Cress case remained, albeit without the support of an ac-
ceptable analysis. That meant that compensation for injury to property between
low and high water marks, brought about by raising the level of a navigable
stream, turned solely on its location. If the property was located on the navi-
gable mainstream, no compensation was due under Chicago. If it was located
on the non-navigable tributary, compensation was due under Cress. It has been
suggested that no reasonable justification exists for the greater protection of the
"tributary-riparian" as opposed to the "mainstream-riparian ' 243 in the face of
the valid exercise of federal power "to deal with and alter the level of the stream
to any extent up to the ordinary high-water mark."'2 44 Some measure of justifi-
cation could be found in the idea of notice of the paramount federal right in
navigable streams. The inadequacies of the notice explanation make this measure
of justification indeed a small one. For the most part, the criticism of the Cress-
Chicago dichotomy is valid.
The Court itself apparently considered the diverging results under Chicago
and Cress undesirable. In United States v. Willow River Power Co. 245 the
Cress case was further "distinguished."
The claimant here had diverted the flow of the non-navigable tributary
through a new channel in order to have it fall from an artificially created drop
into the navigable mainstream. The opinion gives no clear idea as to the location
applies even to United States -v. Lynah, see note 238 supra. The two "access" cases de-
cided prior to Cress, i.e., Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897), and Scranton v.
Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900) imply that damage done in the course of construction in a
navigable stream does not per se lead to compensability. The Court distinguished them
as involving merely "consequential" injury.
241. 312 U.S. 592 (1941).
242. Id. at 595. (Emphasis added.)
243. Note, The Supreme Court, 1949 Term, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 114,137 (1950-51).
244. United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 592, 595 (1941).
245. 324 U.S. 499 (1945) (Justices Roberts and Stone dissented).
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of the power plant. A government dam, raising the level of the mainstream,
caused the reduction of claimant's operating head. No compensation was allowed.
The Court looked upon the claim as the assertion of a property right in the flow
of the navigable stream, or more precisely, in the difference between the natural
and the artificially maintained level. In an analogy to the Chandler-Dunbar
decision 24 6 such a right to "run off" into the navigable stream was rejected.
Mr. Justice Jackson distinguished Cress as having dealt with "the consequences
of changing the level of a non-navigable stream; here it [the government] is
sought to be charged with the same consequences from changing the level in a
navigable one."' 247 The speciousness of the distinction is obvious. In both cases,
the government dam was constructed so as to raise the stream-level of the navi-
gable mainstream. In both cases, there was an impact on the tributary: in Cress
to diminish its current and to flood land between the natural and the artificial
level; in WI/illow River to diminish its current and to destroy the differential
between the natural and the artificial level. And in both cases, run-off ultimately
had to be into the navigable main-stream. Thus it is difficult to deny the charge
of the dissenting opinion that the Cress case had either been disregarded or
overruled. 248
The issue of damage to property located on the non-navigable tributary arose
again in United States v. Kansas City Ins. Co. 249 This time the Court formulated
the issue as it should have done in the Cress case, namely whether:
the United States . . . may raise a navigable stream to its ordinary
high-water mark and maintain it continuously at that level in the in-
terest of navigation, without liability for the effects of that change upon
private property beyond the bed of the stream.250
The Court answered its question in the negative. The dam was erected in the
Mississippi, raising its level to the "previously ascertained ordinary high-water
mark."' 251 The private property was located one and a half miles from the
river and was riparian to the non-navigable tributary. The underflow caused by
246. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 299 U.S. 53 (1913).
247. 324 U.S. 499, 506 (1945). The Cress case was considered binding precedent by
the Court of Claims, as well as by the dissenting Justices, Roberts and Stone.
248. Id. at 514 (dissenting opinion). That charge has found wide support. See Powell,
Just Compensation and the Navigation Power, 31 Wash. L. Rev. 271 (1956) ; Comment,
Informal Condemnation and the Revival of the Cress Case, 18 U. Chi. L. Rev. 355 (1950)
45 Colum. L. Rev. 792 (1945).
Nor is the difference justifiable on the basis of the value claimed, i.e. land in Cress
and power potential in Willow River. It is important to recall that Cress involved both a
claim to land and to power potential and that the Court, in combining the two cases, held
the same rules to be applicable.
249. 339 U.S. 799 (1950) (Justices Douglas, Black, Reed and Minton dissented).
250. Id. at 800-01.
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raising the water level of the Mississippi destroyed the agricultural value of the
land.
The majority clearly based its decision on two propositions: One, that the
United States has "power to improve its navigable waters . . . without liability
for damages resulting to private property within the bed of the navigable
stream." 252 Two, that "the ordinary high-water mark has been accepted as the
limit of the bed of the stream. ' 25 3 From these two propositions the Court derived
the rule that damage beyond the area of the servitude as so defined, e.g., on the
non-navigable tributary, is compensable. Willow River was unconvincingly dis-
tinguished as denying compensation "because the loss of power . . . occurred
within the bed of the navigable river.' 254 If that is the explanation for Willow
River, then the respondent's loss in Kansas City resulted from his lack of right
to the "unfettered flow of the Mississippi in its natural state," as Mr. Justice
Douglas described the basis of the compensation claim.255
In essence, the Court re-established the incongruity, as the dissenters charged,
to "deny compensation to owners adjacent to navigable rivers and require it for
others bordering their tributary for like injuries caused by the single act of lift-
ing the river's mean level to the high-water mark." 256 At times, of course,
there is much merit in achieving certainty, even if that certainty is bought at
the expense of good sense. But there is also no doubt that the real problem before
the Court was to accommodate congressional power and the rights of adjacent
landowners. 257 It is rather doubtful that the conflict of interest was most effica-
ciously solved by leaving the decision to the fortuitous circumstance of location.
Whatever its merits, though, the Court's decision did answer the question of the
physical boundary of the servitude in navigable streams; it extended to the
ordinary high-water mark, burdening bed and embankment in and adjacent
to the navigable stream up to that point, and clothing the United States with
immunity for injuries inflicted in that area; it failed to extend this immunity
to (1) land adjacent to the navigable mainstream but above the ordinary high-
water mark, so-called "upland" and (2) the non-navigable tributary, com-
251. Id. at 801.
252. Id. at 804.
253. Id. at 805.
254. Id. at 807.
255. Id. at 812 (dissenting opinion).
256. Id. at 812 (dissenting opinion). The dissenters are not the only ones reading
Kansas City as a reaffirmance of the Cress case. See 55 Mich. L. Rev. 272 (1956) ; 18 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 355 (1950).
257. "The line therefore must be drawn in accommodation of the two interests."
United States v. Kansas City Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 813 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
The dissent would have the ordinary high-water mark rule include that part of the bed
of the non-navigable tributary which is affected by raising the navigable mainstream to
its ordinary high-water mark.
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pensable private property being that which was "unaffected by the flow of the
rivers or their tributaries ' 25 8 prior to raising the navigable mainstream.
The solution of the conflict between the Cress case on one hand and the
Chicago and Willow River cases on the other as reached in the Kansas City
decision can be formulated differently; the navigation servitude does not, with-
out more, underlie non-navigable streams. 2 9 For all these cases have this in
common, that the federal power was exercised solely on and for the navigable
stream. In none of them had Congress sought to exercise expressly its control
over the non-navigable tributary, as it did in United States v. Grand River Dam
Authority.26 0 When the Court there by-passed the government's claim that
the servitude per se extended to non-navigable waters,2 6' it implicitly reaffirmed
the dichotomous mainstream-tributary compensation rules in the event the navi-
gation power is exercised on the navigable mainstream only.26 2
D. The United States Condemns Land And The Owner Claims Compensation
For Its Special Location Or Site Value
The Kansas City decision bounded the servitude along the "ordinary high-
water mark" of navigable streams, and of navigable streams only. That acknowl-
edged the principle that any taking of the unburdened uplands (i.e., the lands
located above the ordinary high-water mark) was a compensable taking under
the fifth amendment requiring just compensation.
The cases in the next two sections deal with the measure of that compensation,
particularly vis-A-vis a claim that the special location or site value of the property
is an element properly includible in the computation of a "just" recompense.
1. The property is located on a navigable stream
It has previously been suggested that United States v. Chandler-Dunbar
Water Power Co. 2 63 could well be brought into the category presently under
258. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 327 (1917). That means, of course, that
tributary riparian land is compensable even below the ordinary high-water mark, con-
trary to land riparian to the navigable mainstream which, under the Chicago rule, is non-
compensable. In other words, whatever property in or to the non-navigable tributary has
been affected by lifting the navigable mainstream must be compensated regardless of
location (i.e. above or below high-water mark) or the type of use (agricultural or power
development) that is at stake.
259. Just as non-navigable streams are not per se subject to federal control under the
navigation power. See discussion in Part I, I, C. supra, especially note 33 supra.
260. 363 U.S. 229 (1960).
261. See text at note 33 supra.
262. Whether either United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956) or
United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1961) have a bearing on these
rules is discussed in Part II, II, D, (1) infra.
263. 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
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discussion. Chandler-Dunbar came to the Court on exceptions by the United
States to the award below in a condemnation proceeding.264 The award had in-
cluded the value of "raw water," i.e., the present money value of certain rapids
and falls to the company as the riparian owner. 265 The Supreme Court held that
the award erroneously recognized a private property interest in the water power
of the river. 2 6 The formulation of the claim as one to the flow of the water ex-
plains the original categorization of the decision. 26 7 As a matter of computation,
however, the flow or "raw water" value constituted but one element which, to-
gether with others, made up the award for the uplands. 268 Thus it was possible
to characterize the claim as one for the "site or availability value" of the up-
lands.269 The Court itself spoke in a number of places of the value allowed
(by the lower courts) because "of the availability of the parcels in connection
with" water power development.270 It is difficult to see any meaningful
distinction between the value of the water flow itself and the value added
by its mere existence to the abutting land. That most likely explains the different
ways in which the Court referred to the claim. However, formulating the prob-
lem of Chandler-Dunbar as a claim for the flow of the river avoids compound-
ing it with the question of the physical boundary of the servitude. That is, it
avoids the question of how to bound the servitude along the ordinary high-water
mark and yet preclude from the assessment of unburdened land any consideration
of its special adaptability. 27'
Chandler-Dunbar was decided before the Kansas City decision clearly focused
on the relationship between the physical boundary of the servitude and the rules
of compensation.27 2 But regardless of some of its language, the Court must
have looked upon the claim as one seeking compensation for private rights in the
navigable stream itself, rather than for the special location of the uplands. That
264. Id. at 55.
265. Id. at 59.
266. Id. at 74.
267. Namely in the section dealing with the use of the navigable stream, its flow or its
bed.
268. Id. at 74-75.
269. For articles treating Chandler-Dunbar as a problem of injury to or valuation of
upper riparian land see Powell, supra note 248; 55 Mich. L. Rev. 272 (1956). But see
Sato, Water Resources-Comments upon the Federal-State Relationship, 48 Calif. L. Rev.
43 (1960), describing the claim as one for the loss of water power.
270. 229 U.S. 53, 75 (1913). And again at 76: "[T]he Government cannot be justly
required to pay for an element of value which did not inhere in these parcels as uplands."
271. By the same token, the formulation as a claim to the flow of the river makes it
that much easier for the Court to take the servitude "out." Quaere whether a better
balancing process between the public power and the private right would result if the
Court treated the issue as one of the valuation of land, that is, started to some extent
with a presumption of compensability.
272. But it was decided after Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312
(1893) which it ignored or helped overrule, as has been suggested. See Powell, supra
note 248.
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becomes clear from the Court's treatment of a second element of the award.
That element, included in the total evaluation of the uplands, was for the
availability of the land "for lock and canal purposes. ' 2 73 The Supreme Court
overruled the exceptions of the United States to this portion of the award. It
recognized thereby a special site value derived from nothing but the proximity
of the lands in question to the navigable stream. This left three possibilities
for why it spoke of (and rejected any claim based on) "the availability of the
parcels in connection with water power development."
One, the Court was fully aware of the basic synonymity of a claim for (a)
the flow of the water and (b) the value thereby added to abutting land, but
changed its mind between the first and second portion of the award. Even those
fond of likening Supreme Court decisions to railroad tickets274 should find
this proposition outside the realm of the possible. After all, "good for this day
and train only" presumably means at least for one entire trip.
Two, the Court recognized the synonymity of the claims just referred to,
but sought to distinguish availability for (a) water power development and (b)
locks and canals. Efforts have indeed been made to rescue the decision from its
hopeless internal inconsistency on that basis, i.e., by arguing that the "lock value"
is not dependent on the power potential, whereas the "development value" is
dependent on the power potential.2 75 The distinction is not convincing. As a
practical matter, locks and canals require the use of water as much as does the
development of power. If the Chandler-Dunbar Company as riparian owner
had "no private property right" to use the water for one purpose, it remains
inexplicable why it should have such a right for another purpose.
The most plausible explanation therefore is that the Court, despite some
language to the contrary, did not clearly recognize the "water flow claim" and
the "site or availability claim" to be two different ways of articulating a claim
to the water, for one or another purpose. Only lack of clear analysis could
bring forth two such irreconcilable rulings in the same decision.
The Court's approach to the two claims lends further support to this explana-
tion. When it dealt with the "raw water" award, it analyzed the claim in terms
of the navigation servitude. When it dealt with the "lock and canal" award,
it analyzed the claim solely in light of eminent domain rules. The latter analysis,
however, meant one of two things: the Court overlooked the applicability of the
servitude or it assumed its non-applicability. That is so because eminent domain
rules, determining fair market value of compensable property, should come into
play only after a finding that the servitude neither makes the property in question
altogether non-compensable nor, as in the case of uplands, "subtracts" from its
273. 229 U.S. 53, 76 (1913).
274. Like Mr. Justice Roberts, See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944)
at 669 (dissenting opinion).
275. Comment, 55 Mich. L. Rev. 272 (1956).
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compensable value.2 7 6 For the Court here to speak solely of eminent domain
compensation rules therefore means to have answered (or overlooked) the first
question, i.e., is the property affected by servitude compensation rules? The Court
could, of course, have distinguished "site value" from "water flow value" or
"availability for water development" from "availability for locks and canals."
But the two claims were too similar to examine the applicability of the servitude
to the first and not to the second claim. These claims clearly called at least for
the same analysis; most likely, they also called for the same result. That there
was neither can again only be explained by the Court's failure to recognize their
identical nature.
An attempt has been made to reconcile the two rulings by compounding
eminent domain and navigation servitude rules.2 7 7 In discussing the "lock and
canal" award, the Court had found that the prospective value of the land for
the construction of the locks was "beyond the region of the purely conjectural or
speculative, ' 278 and an "immediate probability. ' 279 The reconciliation of the
two rulings is based on the theory that despite the servitude the special site value
was compensable because of the "immediately prospective" use. On the other
hand, the servitude denied compensation for the "remote and conjectural" use
of the flow of the water.
The juxtaposition of "immediate" and "conjectural" could theoretically be
used to reconcile the inconsistencies. But there is no indication at all that the
Court meant to evolve a theory of the servitude that, for reasons unknown,
2 0
made its applicability turn on such (in this context) meaningless concepts as
"immediate" and "conjectural." For that matter, the assumption that use of the
water flow for power development was "remote and conjectural" is itself con-
jectural. Since the Court never got to an examination of the waterflow claim
under rules of eminent domain, it never concerned itself with the probability of
the use. At least there is nothing in the opinion precluding a contrary assumption,
i.e., that such use, too, was "immediately prospective," thus leaving the attempted
reconciliation without any support.
Olson v. United States281 next posed the question whether the special adapta-
bility of certain shorelands for the flowage and storage of water could properly
be considered in ascertaining just compensation. The Court answered the ques-
tion in the negative, but solely on principles of eminent domain, without even a
276. At least that analysis seems called for where compensation is granted. It must be
distinguished from the situation where the Court finds that in no event is compensation
due under eminent domain rules and dispenses with the servitude question on that ground.
See Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 24-6 (1934).
277. Powell, supra note 248.
278. 229 U.S. 53, 77 (1913).
279. Ibid.
280. Nor does Mr. Powell suggest any.
281. 292 U.S. 246 (1934). The case involved a condemnation proceeding by the United
States to acquire flowage easements abutting the Lake of the Woods in Minnesota.
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mention of the servitude.28 2 It denied the existence of the necessary "reasonable
possibility" that the owner could use his land for reservoir purposes. But it did
so not because riparian owners are prevented, as against the United States, from
storing water and thus interfering with the navigable capacity of the stream.
Rather, the Court found that "the number of parcels, private owners, Indian
tribes and sovereign proprietors to be dealt with" 2 13 made it impossible for the
petitioners to acquire all the lands or easements necessary. Under these facts,
therefore, there was "no element of value belonging to petitioners that legiti-
mately could be attributed to use and adaptability of their lands for reservoir
purposes. '
284
The Court took up the problem once more in United States v. Twin City
Power Co. 28 5 By that time, it had decided the Kansas City case, 286 ascribing to the
United States "power to improve its navigable waters without liability . . .
within the bed of the navigable stream." 28 7 The "ordinary high-water mark"
in turn was designated as having "been accepted as the limit of the bed of the
stream." 288 Private property beyond the bed of the stream was therefore entitled
to compensation. "Beyond the bed of the stream" might mean abutting the
navigable stream. It might also mean abutting a non-navigable tributary.
The land involved in Twin City was situated along either side of the navi-
gable Savannah River. It had been acquired as a prospective reservoir site.
However, several federal licenses for dam construction, issued between 1901
and 1919, had been left to expire and the site was finally included in the Clark
Hill project adopted by Congress in 1941. Condemnation proceedings had been
brought as part of the procedure for the completion of the project and at issue,
inter alia, was the compensability of the dam site value.28
9
There was no doubt that the land was compensable. It was unburdened with
the servitude long before Kansas City limited the servitude to the ordinary high-
282. Ibid. There is a more theoretical than real possibility that the Court considered
the servitude totally inapplicable because the congressional authorization of the condem-
nation spoke in terms of carrying into effect a treaty with Canada. But treaty obligations
also played a part in Chandler-Dunbar. That fulfillment of such obligations partly moti-
vates appropriation of the stream flow does therefore not automatically preclude the
applicability of the servitude. Hence it would seem the Court would have said that it
considered the servitude inapplicable because of the treaty obligations had that indeed
been the reason for its failure to deal with the servitude.
283. Id. at 260. The area involved 1035 miles of shoreline and approximately 850 par-
cels owned by more than 775 people, excluding mortgagees.
284. Id. at 261.
285. 350 U.S. 222 (1956) (Justices Burton, Frankfurter, Minton and Harlan dis-
sented).
286. 339 U.S. 799 (1950) (Justices Douglas, Black, Reed and Minton dissented).
287. Id. at 804. (Emphasis added.)
288. Id. at 805.
289. The value of the land as a potential power site was approximately $267 per acre
as opposed to a value of $37 per acre if treated as agricultural land only. See footnote 9
of the dissenting opinion, 350 U.S. at 237.
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water mark.20° That limit, in any event, also spelled the limit to governmental
immunity from compensation. There was therefore no reason why the full
measure of "just compensation" should not contain all elements giving value to
the condemned property. The "lock and canal" award of the Chandler-Dunbar
decision supported this still further.20 ' Twin City's claim seemed to follow from
the implications of Kansas City and was indistinguishable from the second ruling
in Chandler-Dunbar. Nor was it likely to stumble over the requirement of
"reasonable possibility" of use that was the undoing of the petitioners in Olson
v. United States.2u 2 For apparently the potential use of the land for a dam site
was more than speculative. 208
On the other hand, any reliance on the "lock and canal" award was over-
shadowed by its basic inconsistency with the rejection of any right to the flow
or power potential of the water. And Kansas City was in ill favor with some
members of the Court, although for a different reason.294 Perhaps it is not sur-
prising then that Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in Twin City
Power Co. (as he had written for the dissenters in Kansas City) rejected the
claim and at the same time threw doubt on the viability of the Kansas City rule.
To deny compensation for the site value of the uplands meant to deal with the
argument that their location "above and beyond the high-water mark" established
their immunity against the servitude. The "flaw in that reasoning," as the Court
saw it, was that
the landowner here seeks a value in the flow of the stream, a value
that inheres in the government's servitude and one that under our
decisions the government can grant or withhold as it chooses. It is
no answer to say that payment is sought only for the location value of
the fast lands. That special location value is due to the flow of the
stream .... 295
The equation of site value and water flow made the first ruling in the
Chandler-Dunbar case directly controlling. The now completely untenable "lock
and canal award" was lelegated to a footnote together with a half-hearted
290. There had never been any doubt regarding the right to some compensation for
such land, at least in the case of flooding. See Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 166 (1871) and note 238 supra.
291 I.e., that portion of the award including in the valuation of the lands an item for
their "adaptability for lock and canal purposes." 229 U.S. 53, 79 (1913).
292. 292 U.S. 246 (1934). The question might have become important if the Court
either evaluated the claim on eminent domain principles exclusively or if there was in-
deed a connection between "immediate versus conjectural" and the servitude.
293. 350 U.S. 222, 237 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
294. Namely that it made a senseless distinction between tributary and mainstream
riparians.
295. 350 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1956). (Former emphasis, the Court's; latter emphasis
added.)
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attempt at distinction.296 That aspect of the Chandler-Dunbar case must be
thought of as having, sub silentio, joined the past history of the navigation
servitude.29
7
The identification of the value of the water flow with the value it adds to the
abutting land did two things. It solved the Chandler-Dunbar (internal) dilemma
in a common sense manner. It also bypassed the Kansas City rule requiring
compensation for property "beyond the bed of the stream." The Court distin-
guished Kansas City on that basis. 298 Aside from the distinction, though, Mr.
Justice Douglas may have meant to do more to Kansas City. In discussing Chand-
ler-Dunbar, he pointed out that some of the land there involved lay in the
stream bed, some above high-water mark.
"But the location of the land was not determinative."
299
On their face, the words are limited to their immediate context, namely that
the location was irrelevant because at issue were claims to the stream itself. Never-
theless they are susceptible of a different, more significant interpretation. For
one, the Kansas City rule turns the compensation question on the location of
the property involved; for another (and corollary of the first), the location of
the property determines whether title is or is not burdened with the servitude;
finally, the words "But the location of the land was not determinative" come
from the same Justice who looked upon the solution of Kansas City as an un-
desirable way to shirk the real problem-"to accommodate congressional power
and the rights of adjacent landowners." 3 0 0
For these reasons the statement about the irrelevance of location might have
been meaningful beyond its immediate setting. What it could have signified, is
easy to conjecture: that Kansas City, decided by a divided (and different) Court
might not withstand re-examination. But aside from implications for its future
fate, the Kansas City rule had suffered a present qualification. Common sense
may indeed have required equal treatment for "water flow" and "availability"
values. But it seems to matter little whether both were categorized as claiming
interests in the stream or interests appended to the adjacent (and under Kansas
City unburdened) land because of the stream, so long as both were categorized
together. Thus the Twin City formulation avoided the Kansas City rule only
verbally. For all practical purposes, Twin City "extended" the servitude (or
more accurately, the range of non-compensable losses) to the uplands in this
296. Id. at 226.
297. See also Note, The Supreme Court, 1955 Term, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 83, 131 (1956),
for the suggestion that Twin City overrules the "lock award."
298. 350 U.S. 222, 225.
299. Id. at 227.
300. See United States v. Kansas City Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 813 (1950), note 257
supra.
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sense, but in this sense only: the ordinary high-water mark still bounded the
servitude. Land beyond it was compensable. But in determining that compen-
sation, no value could be derived from the flow of the navigable river it
abutted. 801
At this point a recent Supreme Court decision must be examined which in
one sense constitutes a sequel to Twin City. United States v. Virginia Elec.
& Power Co.80 2 involved the compensability of a flowage easement, acquired
by respondent's predecessor in title and extending over 1540 acres. For purposes
of a dam and reservoir project,80 3 the United States obtained, by condemnation,
a flowage easement over 1840 acres. That acreage included the 1540 acres bur-
dened with the respondent's easement. Pursuant to an agreement with the fee
owner, the United States had deposited one dollar as the "full amount of the
award of just compensation." 30 4 Upon his intervention, the respondent received a
judgment which measured the value of the easement by the fair market value
of the property. The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit on the basis of its decision in the Twin City case.80 5 That deci-
sion having been reversed,80 6 the Supreme Court per curiam vacated the judg-
ment here and remanded the case for consideration in the light of its Twin City
ruling.3 0 7 On remand, the district court excluded " 'any element of value aris-
ing from the availability of the land for water power purposes due to its being
situate on a navigable stream.' "1308 Nevertheless, it arrived at an evaluation
of $65,520 and rendered judgment for that amount.8 09 The case was returned
301. The dissenting Justices (Burton, Frankfurter, Minton and Harlan) considered
the lock and canal award of Chandler-Dunbar controlling. Their attempt, however, to
explain the "water flow" ruling in that case on the basis that the "rejected values were
not part of the fair market value of the land . . . due to the speculative nature of the
proposed use" is unconvincing. There is nothing in the Chandler-Dunbar opinion indi-
cating that the Court ever considered that question in that context, let alone allowed it
to be decisive. For a discussion of the role Kansas City plays in the valuation of uplands
abutting non-navigable streams, see infra.
302. 365 U.S. 624 (1961) (Mr. Justice Stewart writing for the Court with Mr. Justice
Douglas concurring separately, and Mr. Justice Whittaker, with whom the Chief Justice
and Mr. Justice Black joined, dissenting).
303. Authorized by Congress in 1944, to be located on the Roanoke River in Virginia
and North Carolina. The flowage easement extended over fast lands adjacent to the
Dan River, a navigable tributary of the Roanoke. Id. at 624-25.
304. The owner agreed to the nominal award because the lake to be created would
enhance the value of the remaining estate as a wild game reserve. Id. at 625, n.1.
305. United States v. 2979.72 Acres of Land, 218 F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1955).
306. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
307. United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 350 U.S. 956 (1956).
308. United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 626 (1961) quoting
the explicit directions given the Commissioners by the district court.
309. Id. at 627. The court of appeals again affirmed, United States v. 2979.72 Acres of
Land, 270 F.2d 707 (4th Cir. 1959), and the Supreme Court granted certiorari, 362 U.S.
947 (1960).
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to the Supreme Court on the government's claim that the easement " 'had no
compensable value when appropriated by the United States.' "310 The Court
disagreed, holding that the easement had value disconnected from the stream
flow and was to that extent compensable.
One point of the opinion in particular bears on the preceding discussion of
Twin City Power Co. The Court reaffirmed that the navigation servitude
"affects" the measure of damages when land beyond the high-water mark of
the stream is taken. That measure must therefore exclude a site value which "is
attributable in the end to the flow of the stream." 3 1' As has been pointed out,
viewing the claim for dam site value as a claim attributable to the flow of the
stream is a device which avoids an express qualification of the Kansas City rule
regarding the supposedly unburdened uplands. But however that qualification
was verbalized, by now it seems to have gained the support of the entire Court
and United States v. Twin City Power Co. to have become a unanimously
adopted rule six years after its pronouncement.31 2
The actual analysis of the government's claim is more a struggle over its exact
formulation than over the applicable rules. The decision that the flowage ease-
ment is compensable does not alter or modify established principles of the navi-
gation servitude. Some discussion of it may nevertheless be warranted.
As already mentioned, the United States contended for the non-compensability
of the easement. It did so on the theory that its only value was in conjunction
with water power development. The easement was alleged to depend, in other
words, on the flow of the stream. The respondent agreed to the exclusion of any
"availability value." However, he claimed compensation for any "other value"
inherent in the easement and not dependent on the stream-flow. The issue so
joined was "whether the respondent's easement might be found to have value
other than in connection with the flow of the stream."'313
The Court found that such a value existed, "attributable not to water power,
but to the depreciative impact of the easement upon the nonriparian uses of the
310. United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 627 (1961).
311. Id. at 629. In view of the history of the case, the respondent had acknowledged
that the courts below were correct in excluding any "availability" value.
312. The Court had been unanimous when it remanded the first judgment for consid-
eration in light of Twin City. See United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 350
U. S. 956 (1956). More significantly, none of the Justices here (365 U. S. 624) take excep-
tion to the reiteration of the Twin City principles. A second point worth noting is that Mr.
Justice Stewart described the servitude in the language of the Kansas City decision. If
there is method in this manner, quaere whether Kansas City has thereby gained new re-
spectability and support. And quaere whether the possibility of so reading Mr. Justice
Stewart's opinion explains Mr. Justice Douglas's separate concurrence which seems
merely to repeat the Court's reasons, albeit far more clearly.
313. 365 U.S. 624, 629-30 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
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property." 314 Consequently, it concluded that the government must compensate
the easement owner, just as it would have to compensate the landowner for any
value not stemming from the flow of the stream, but from nonriparian uses of
the property.3 15 Or, as Mr. Justice Douglas stated more explicitly:
The owner (of the easement) stands in the shoes of his predecessor in
title. The owner of the easement is entitled .. . to no water-power
value . .. to nothing that gains value from the flow of the stream,
from any head of water, or from the strategic location of his land for
hydroelectric development of the river. But the owner of the easement
and the owner of the subservient fee have all the other parts of the
bundle of rights that represent 'property' within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment.31
The dissenting Justices disputed that the easement owner's "bundle of rights"
contained any parts other than a claim to the use of the waters.
"The sole and only right the power company ever had in these lands
was the right to dam and back the river's waters upon them."
3 17
Consequently, the easement had no value at the time the government took it.
Its exercise had always, under the Federal Power Act, been contingent on the
issuance of a federal license, authorizing the private damming of the river.
Moreover, authorization of the dam and reservoir project "appropriated the
entire flow of the river for the declared public purpose." 318 Last, when the
United States took the easement there existed "no posibility that the power
company could ever dam and back the river's waters upon these lands.' 319 Both
Twin City and Chandler-Dunbar therefore "clearly" required the conclusion
that the easement was valueless.3 20
314. Id. at 630. (Emphasis added.) The Court cites to numerous eminent domain
authorities for the proposition that "the valuation of an easement upon the basis of its
destructive impact upon other uses of the servient fee is a universally accepted method
of determining its worth."
315. Ibid. Thus the only question left was the method of determining the amount of
compensation. The district court had treated the subservient fee as being without value
and had awarded the respondent the entire value of what the government had appro-
priated in the 1540 acres at issue, excluding any "site value." The Court disapproved
the apportionment and developed instead this formula: "The value of the easement is the
non-riparian value of the servient land discounted by the improbability of the easement's
exercise." Id. at 635. The judgment was vacated and the case remanded with directions.
316. Id. at 637-38 (concurring opinion).
317. Id. at 638-39 (dissenting opinion). (Emphasis added.)
318. Id. at 639 (dissenting opinion), citing from United States v. Twin City Power
Co. 350 U.S. 222, 225 (1956).
319. 365 U.S. 624, 639 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
320. Id. at 642 (dissenting opinion).
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Both definitions of the respondent's right have merit. But on balance, the
dissent seems the more persuasive--all the more so vis-i-vis Mr. Justice Stewart's
characterization of the value claimed in Twin City as being "attributable in the
end to the flow of the stream, over which the Government has exclusive domi-
nion." 321 It seems that a flowage easement acquired for the purpose of ulti-
mately constructing a dam across the navigable river "in the end" derives its
value from that river.8 22
2. The property is located on a non-navigable stream
Only two cases dealing with the evaluation of property abutting a non-
navigable stream will be discussed here. The third, United States v. Grand
River Dam luthority 23 will be treated in the following section.
United States ex. rel. TVA v. Powelson 24 reached the Court for the first
321. Id. at 629. (Emphasis added.)
322. See also Note, The Supreme Court 1960 Term, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 125-27 (1961),
agreeing that Virginia Electric 'reaffirmed Twin City's narrow holding" and that the
reaffirmance "suggests that Twin City will not be overruled." The editors agree further
that a different result could have been reached. Their analysis differs from the present
one, however. It proceeds from the premise that in Twin City "the Court relied on the fact
that the government's decision to undertake the river project destroyed the power-site
value of the condemned land." Id. at 126 (quaere whether this is a very fortunate formu-
lation of the basis for Twin City). Taking the effect of government intervention into
account here, the argument continues, would have rendered the easement almost value-
less, for absent a private power development plan it was saleable only to those who
would have wantd to obtain clear title to the underlying fee. But that is certainly one (if
not the only one) of the non-riparian uses the Court had in mind. "It [the easement] had
been acquired for a valuable consideration. It had a marketability roughly commensurate
with the marketability of the subservient fee. Only an adventurous purchaser would have
acquired the underlying fee interest ... for any purpose whatever, without also purchas-
ing the easement." United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 630 (1961).
Finally, the editors see in the Court's formula a demonstration of the inconsistency of
Virginia Electric with Twin City because by disregarding the government's intervention
in determining the "probability of the easement's exercise" (see note 315 supra) the
formula is said to take into account the possibilities of private use of the water. That is
not a convincing interpretation. The formula expressly provides for the disregard of all
riparian values. With that, the effect of the servitude is exhausted and rules of eminent
domain govern the determination of the non-riparian market value. Under those rules it
is clear that the effect of the government's special need may neither enhance nor diminish
the non-riparian market value. Theoretically therefore, the formula does not conflict with
Twin City. The practical difficulty is again to attribute to the easement any genuine non-
riparian use. (See also the dissenting opinion in Virginia Electric.)
But see Borough of Ford City, Pennsylvania v. United States, 213 F. Supp. 248 (W. D.
Penn. 1963) finding that the value of a sewer collection system was not attributable
"solely" to the flow of the Allegheny River and its riparian location. Hence compsensa-
tion was due for damage resulting from permanently raising the stream above the or-
dinary high-water mark. The opinion makes no attempt to state in what the "independ-
ent" value lies.
323. 363 U. S. 229 (1960).
324. 319 U. S. 266 (1943) (Justice Jackson, with whom Chief Justice Stone and Jus-
tices Roberts and Frankfurter joined, dissented).
MAY, 1963]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
time in 1942.325 Under United States v. Cress 326 private property within and
along the non-navigable tributary which had been "unaffected by the flow of
the rivers or their tributaries" 327 prior to raising the navigable mainstream was
not burdened by the servitude. Earlier, United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Wa-
ter Power Co.32 s had rejected any claim for the loss of the flow of a navigable
stream; or, which is the same, it had rejected any claim for the value which the
presence of the flow added to the adjacent land.
The government based its argument in the Powelson case on Chandler-
Dunbar. It contended that no compensation was due for loss of water power
value, albeit the stream in question was non-navigable. The Court, perhaps
because of United States v. Cress, avoided the constitutional issue.
We do not stop to consider that question. For if we assume, without
deciding, that rights in the "flow" of a non-navigable stream created
by local law are property for which the United States must pay com-
pensation . . . the water power value . . . sought . . . cannot be
allowed.3 29
The reason on which the Court based its decision was the "too remote and
speculative" principle of the law of eminent domain. 3
Eventually the United States lost on its argument as to the non-compen-
sability of water power value derived from the non-navigable stream. On re-
mand, the court of appeals read the Supreme Court decision narrowly as
"holding only that profits attributable to an enterprise which [the claimant]
hoped to launch are inadmissible as evidence of the value of the lands which
were taken." 331 Consequently, the court directed that evidence be admitted
showing additional value for the property based on "dam site availability". 332
The Supreme Court denied certiorari 3 33-with whatever implications that fol-
low from such a denial.
325. The case was remanded to the court of appeals and reached the Court a second
time, when a writ of certiorari was sought. See United States el rel. TVA v. Powelson
138 F. 2d 343 (4th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U. S. 773 (1944).
326. 243 U.S. 317 (1917).
327. Id. at 327.
328. 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
329. 319 U. S. 266,273 (1943).
330. Nor did Mr. Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion suggest the applicability of the
servitude. Rather, the dissent disagreed with the treatment accorded the respondent's
power of condemnation.
331. See 138 F. 2d 343, 344 (4th Cir. 1943) quoting from the Supreme Court opinion.
332. Id. at 346.
333. United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 321 U.S. 773 (1944). The petition for the
writ of certiorari argued that the Supreme Court had removed the entire question of
water-power value from the case and that consequently the order below was contrary to
the decision of the Court in United States ex. rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 (1943).
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Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand Hydro 34 again concerned the ad-
missibility of evidence. The Authority contended that the Federal Power Act
so far affected the use of value of the property as a power site as to make any
testimony inadmissible that dealt with that value.335 The Court rejected the
contention. But again it did so for reasons unrelated to the servitude. It found
that the plaintiff-Authority had filed the condemnation proceeding in exercise
of the eminent domain powers it possessed as a public utility under state law;
it had not sought to act in exercise of the federal license it received after the
institution of the proceeding, but prior to trial. 336 Thus the question was to be
decided by state, not federal law. The governing Oklahoma rules, however,
admitted evidence of dam site value without a showing by the defendant that it
had obtained authorization for the construction of the dam.
The Court expressly left open the effect that a different plaintiff might have
had on the outcome of the decision.
If either the United States, or its licensee as such, were seeking to
acquire this land, under the Federal Power Act, it might face different
considerations. . . . [W]e express no opinion upon what would be
the appropriate measure of value in a condemnation action brought by
the United States or by one of its licensees in reliance upon rights
derived under the Federal Power Act.33 7
The decision was therefore limited to a condemnation proceeding brought
under state law. Nevertheless, the dissenting Justices saw in it a grant to private
parties of "an entrenched property interest in the public domain. ' 3 3 8 The grant
was unwarranted because of the Federal Power Act, through which the United
States was claimed to have asserted "its exclusive dominion and control over this
water power." 3 3
9
FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.3 40 has since undermined the basis
334. 335 U. S. 359 (1948) (Justices Douglas, Black, Murphy and Rutledge dissented).
335. The property was located along the Grand River, a non-navigable tributary of
the navigable Arkansas.
336. Since the FPC had found that the navigable stages of the Arkansas River would
be affected by the project, a federal license was required, notwithstanding the proposed
location on a non-navigable stream. 335 U. S. 359, 365-66 (1948).
337. Id. at 373. •
338. Id. at 376 (dissenting opinion).
339. Id. at 375 (dissenting opinion). The dissent read United States v. Willow River
Co. and Oklahoma v. Atkinson as bringing non-navigable streams into the exclusive con-
trol of the United States over water power, established by Chandler-Dunbar and Appa-
lachian Power. Grand Hydro was decided after Willow River had seemingly overruled
Cress and before Kansas City re-established the rule of the latter. For the time being,
therefore, it was indeed reasonable to assert that property within or along a non-
navigable tributary, too, was burdened with the servitude.
340. 347 U. S. 239 (1954) (Justices Reed and Jackson took no part in the decision;
Justices Douglas, Black and Minton dissented).
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of the dissenting opinion by holding that the Federal Power Act has not
abolished private proprietary rights, existing under state law, to use the waters
of navigable streams for power purposes.841 Nor could the Federal Power Act
under that interpretation be said to have abolished such rights in non-navigable
streams.
At least incidentally, Niagara Mohawk has also answered the question ex-
pressly left open in Grand Hydro. If the Federal Power Act has not destroyed
state-created rights to the use of water, then presumably it has not destroyed the
values which the existence of that water adds to the abutting land. Therefore
where the United States or its licensee proceeds under the Federal Power Act,
"the appropriate measure of value" would seem to be the same that it was in
Grand Hydro.
42
With that, the obvious question is left-that of the "appropriate measure of
value" outside the Federal Power Act.
3. United States v. Grand River Dam Authority$48
It may be well to recount briefly the situation that existed regarding non-
navigable streams when Grand River Dam reached the Court in 1960.
By that time, Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co.3 4 4 had, at
least arguably, recognized a constitutional power to " 'treat the watersheds as
a key to flood control on navigable streams and their [non-navigable] tribu-
taries.' "845 But there had been no complaint "that any property owner will
not receive just compensation. ... . s46
On that issue, United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co.847 had since at-
tempted to bound the servitude along the ordinary high-water mark of navigable
streams. Compensation was therefore due for any taking beyond the area so
limited, e.g., of property interests in the flow of the non-navigable tributary or in
abutting land. At least that was so if the exercise of federal power was by its
terms limited to the navigable mainstream.
But for navigable streams, United States v. Twin City Power Co.34s had
341. See FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239, 250-56 (1954) for the
Court's discussion of the Federal Water Power Act.
342. See also Comment, Federal-State Conflicts over the Control of Western Waters,
60 Colum. L. Rev. 967 (1960), treating the Federal Power Act as a statutory limitation
on the exercise of federal power in view of the reading it received in Niagara Mohawok.
343. 363 U. S. 229 (1960).
344. 313 U. S. 508 (1941).
345. Mr. Justice Douglas in Grand River Dam, 363 U.S. at 232, speaking of Okla-
homa v. Atkinson. See Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508
(1941), at 525.
346. Oklahoma ex. rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 534 (1941).
347. 339 U. S. 799 (1950).
348. 350 U. S. 222 (1956).
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qualified the rule. It had equated site value with water flow value. It had
thereby extended the range of non-compensable losses to include site value. At
least that was so where the United States or its licensee had not proceeded under
the Federal Power Act. For in 1954, FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.
s40
had construed that act as not abolishing private property rights to the use of
water and thus, by implication, as not abolishing site value where recognized by
state law.
3 5 0
United States v. Grand River Dam Authority posed the question left open:
assuming Congress attempted to exercise its alleged power over the non-navigable
tributary (Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co.) and assuming
it did so expressly rather than incidentally. i.e., when dealing with the navi-
gable mainstream (United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co.)-how well
would the rights of the tributary-riparian fare?
The rights involved were water power rights, to be used for the development
of electric power on the non-navigable Grand River under an exclusive state
franchise.8 5 ' They were destroyed when the United States erected the Fort
Gibson dam, built under a 1941 Act of Congress as an "integral part of a com-
prehensive plan for the regulation of navigation, the control of floods, and the
production of power on the Arkansas River and its tributaries" 52 -- here the
Grand River.
Clearly these rights were non-compensable if the stream were navigable.
Clearly they were also non-compensable if the servitude extended to non-navi-
gable waters, as the United States sought to argue. And clearly they were com-
pensable if Kansas City controlled the situation.3 53
The Supreme Court unanimously concluded:
When the United States appropriates the flow either of a navigable or a
nonnavigable stream pursuant to its superior power under the Com-
merce Clause, it is exercising established prerogatives and is beholden
to no one.
54
349. 347 U. S. 239 (1954).
350. See also the discussion of Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand Hydro, 335
U. S. 359 (1948), text at note 334 supra.
351. The necessary federal license for the construction of three dams, to be located
on the non-navigable Grand River, had been obtained.
352. United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U. S. 229, 230 (1960).
353. Kansas City specifically involved only the agricultural value of abutting land.
But beyond that, Kansas City imposed on the United States liability for effects in the
non-navigable tributary of changing the navigable mainstream-the property in the non-
navigable tributary entitled to compensation being all that was "unaffected by the flow of
the rivers" prior to raising the navigable mainstream (including, in other words, water
power rights).
354. 363 U.S. 229, 233 (1960).
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The superior power which the United States was exercising, however, was not
a power that extended to non-navigable streams per se; rather, it was the protec-
tion of the navigable capacity of the mainstream which thus enabled the United
States to appropriate with immunity the flow of non-navigable tributaries
affecting that capacity.
State-created rights to the use of the flow of non-navigable streams were thus
as vulnerable as state-created rights to the use of navigable streams.
United States v. Twin City Power Co., furthermore, had treated the claim
for special site value as but another way of claiming the flow of the river. The
claim to the (there navigable) stream-flow being impermissible, so was the claim
for the special site value. It follows that wherever the claim to the non-navigable
stream-flow is impermissible, so is the claim for any special site value.
Thus the question that was not decided in United States ex. rel. TVA1 v.
Powelson3 55 seems answered: land abutting non-navigable streams the flow of
which has been appropriated by the United States may not be compensated on
the basis of its dam site value.
That, however, completes the "qualification" or perhaps more aptly, the
"hedging-in process" of the Kansas City rule. The servitude may still be bounded
by the ordinary high-water mark. 56 But it "affects" (to use Mr. Justice Stew-
art's word) :357 one, the uplands abutting the navigable stream in that their
site value is non-compensable; two, rights to the flow of the non-navigable tribu-
tary and three, site value of uplands abutting the non-navigable tributary. All
are non-compensable if, and only if, the United States has expressly exercised
its power to protect the navigable capacity of the mainstream.
E. Summary
The many pages dealing with the consequences inflicted by the servitude on
private property lead to these conclusions:
(1) The navigation servitude extends to the ordinary high-water mark of
navigable streams and may be maintained at that level by artificial means.35 8
(2) Within that boundary line, title to all private property is defeasible
without compensation as against the exercise of the navigation power by the
United States. Such property includes title to the stream bed,359 title to struc-
355. 319 U. S. 266 (1943).
356. See United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U. S. 624 (1961) which
reiterated the Kansas City principles.
357. Id. at 629.
358. United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U. S. 799 (1950) ; United States
v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 312 U. S. 592 (1941).
359. Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913).
[VoL.. 3
FEDERAL POWER IN WESTERN WATERS
tures within the stream, 360 access to the stream,3 61 title to abutting land up to
the ordinary high-water mark3 62 and rights to the stream flow.
363
(3) Beyond the boundaries set by the ordinary high-water mark, the servi-
tude affects abutting uplands in that value attributable to their location near
a navigable stream is non-compensable. 36 4
(4) Injury to private property within or abutting non-navigable streams
is compensable if inflicted in the course of an exercise of the navigation power
limited to the navigable mainstream.3 65
(5) In the event Congress expressly exercises the navigation power over
the non-navigable tributary in order to protect the navigable capacity of the
mainstream,
(a) title to private property within the boundaries set by the ordinary
high-water mark of the non-navigable tributary is defeasible without com-
pensation ;366
(b) beyond these boundaries, the servitude affects abutting uplands in
that value attributable to their location is non-compensable.367
(6) Neither prior state nor congressional sanction of the right in question,
nor prior congressional inaction, cause the sovereign to be estopped. 36 A con-
gressional recognition of the right as compensable would be effective.3 60
PART III
CONSUMPTIVE WATER RIGHTS
COMPENSABILITY OF CONSUMPTIVE WATER RIGHTS
A. Introduction
At the very outset of the present investigation a number of questions were
360. E.g., the bridge cases: Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States, 242 U.S. 409
(1917) ; Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907) ; the power plant in
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
361. United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945) ; Scranton v.
Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900) ; Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897).
362. United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 592 (1941).
363. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956) United States v.
Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
364. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
365. United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950) ; United States v.
Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
366. See the discussion of United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229
(1961).
367. Ibid.
368. Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States, 242 U.S. 409 (1917) ; United States v.
Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913) ; Union Bridge Co. v. United
States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907).
369. Such as in the Federal Power Act cases. See FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power
Corp., 347 U.S. 239 (1954).
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posed, for which answers shall now be attempted in light of the conclusions
reached. To restate the questions:
(1) Is the owner of a state-created consumptive water right on a navigable
stream entitled to compensation if a federal dam causes its destruction or impair-
ment?
(2) Assuming no compensation is due, does a claim to compensation arise if
the United States, in distributing project water among intra-state users, ignores
state-created priorities in the subsequent distribution of impounded waters?
(3) Do the results change if the right in question is that to the use of the
non-navigable tributary of a navigable mainstream?
Finally, brief consideration will be given to the valuation of desert uplands.
B. Compensation For State-created Consumptive Water Rights On Navigable
Streams
1. Compensation for the loss of the right itself
It should be noted that none of the previously discussed cases, whether deny-
ing or granting compensation, concerned a consumptive water right or, more
narrowly, an irrigation water right.370 Congress, of course, has often been solici-
tous of state-created Western water rights.3 7 ' The construction of Section 8 of
the Reclamation Act as a congressional agreement to pay for water rights ac-
quired under state law has been an important source of protection for Western
water right owners.8 7 2 A good many federal projects in the West are reclamation
projects.8 73 At the same time, the West is the area where irrigation water rights
are not only most important, but also most numerous. The combination of these
various factors may be one reason for the dearth of decisions dealing with the
compensability of irrigation water rights vis-A-vis the navigation servitude.8 74
But while there is no case subjecting irrigation water rights to the rule of no
compensation nothing on the other hand suggests their compensability. The
analysis of navigation cases has many facets: the kind of stream involved, the
purposes a given-project is to serve, the ascertainment of congressional intent, the
370. The term "consumptive water right" is here used interchangeably with "irriga-
tion water right" although the latter is the narrower concept.
371. See for example section 8 of the Reclamation Act, supra note 80.
372. See United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950). For the propo-
sition that this agreement was "voluntary", i.e., that Congress was not under the Constitu-
tion required to pay for these rights, see the concurring part of Mr. Justice Douglas's
opinion in Gerlach. Such owners are therefore protected where owners in non-Reclama-
tion Act states most likely are not. See also Note, The Supreme Court 1949 Term, 64 Harv.
L. Rev. 114, 137 (1950) which justifies the preferential treatment on the basis of the
"unique significance of water rights in the West."
373. See for instance the Central Valley Project described in Gerlach Live Stock Co.
374. And see section 27 of the Federal Power Act, likewise requiring compliance with
state law, thus contributing to the lack of decisions.
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physical boundaries of the servitude. But the particular manner in which the use
of the stream is sought to be maintained against the superior federal right seems
irrelevant to the analysis. Only in one context does the precise content of the
compensation claim become important, namely in the evaluation of the "up-
lands." Even here the claim fails once it is shown to derive "in the end" from the
presence of the stream flow. And again it makes no difference just how the right
underlying such a claim would be exercised in its particulars.
Any assertion therefore that the use of a navigable stream for irrigation
purposes is the kind of "vested property right" that survives the exercise of the
congressional power to deal with the nation's waterways is unfounded. The
congressional appropriation of a navigable river for the (perhaps only incidental)
benefit of navigation leaves the owner of state-created water rights without
recourse. Regarding actual diversion works, placed in the river, United States
v. Chandler-Dunbar Co.37 5 is directly applicable. There a right was claimed to
the construction and continued maintenance in the river of certain structures,
provided only those structures did not impede navigation. But having foreclosed
itself from an independent judicial inquiry into the latter question, the Court
concluded:
[E] very such structure in the water of a navigable river is subordinate
to the right of navigation, and subject to the obligation to suffer the
consequences of the improvement of navigation, and must be removed
if Congress, in the assertion of its power over navigation, shall deter-
mine that their continuance is detrimental to the public interest in the
navigation of the river.3 76
It hardly seems important that the Chandler-Dunbar structures were to serve
the particular purpose of facilitating the commercial exploitation of the river for
power development. A different result in favor of structures serving the partic-
ular purpose of facilitating the exploitation of the river for irrigation would
call for a distinction based on, in this context, immaterial facts.
As for the actual withdrawal of the water, Chandler-Dunbar again seems
conclusive of the issue. The claim to the non-consumptive use of water constituted
the assertion of private ownership over "the running water in a great navigable
stream."3 77 The claim to the consumptive use of such water must then do like-
wise. And if such an assertion was "inconceivable" in the one case, so ought it to
be in the other. Nor would the "owner" of the water right in question be per-
375. 229 U.S. 53 (1913). Such works would have to be licensed under the Rivers and
Harbors Act.
376. Id. at 70.
377. Id. at 69. See Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45
Calif. L. Rev. 638 (1957) on the semantic problems regarding the use of the word
property in connection with water and water rights.
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mitted to show that his individual diversion does not impede navigation. The
congressional declaration that the protection or improvement of navigation
requires the appropriation of the entire stream flow would again have the legis-
lative and conclusive effect similar declarations have had in the past.
Thus the question of the compensability of a state-created, consumptive water
right on a navigable stream must be answered in the negative. Any destruction or
impairment of such a use, caused by a federal dam, constructed under congres-
sional authorization and serving, perhaps incidentally only, the improvement
of navigation, is merely the exercise of a power to which such use had always
been subject.
2. Compensation for loss of priority in the intrastate distribution of pro-
ject water
The question briefly to be examined is the power of the United States to dis-
regard state distribution laws in the intrastate distribution of so-called "project
water." More particularly, if the United States does disregard state-created
priorities among intrastate project users, has it taken compensable private prop-
erty? The question must be answered by reference to previously established
propositions. The United States may appropriate the entire flow of a navigable
stream; the congressional judgment that the entire stream flow is required for
navigation and that the protection of navigation should take preference over all
other uses of the stream is legislative and, in the absence of arbitrary congressional
dealings, non-reviewable; the exercise of the federal power ousts the concurrent
jurisdiction of the states; no state-created private property rights to the use of
the water are good against the superior federal navigation power and their total
or partial destruction is thus non-compensable.
It would seem to negate these propositions, clearly supported in the deci-
sions, 3 78 to conclude that the distribution of project water must take place in
accord with state law-or that, in other words, the United States loses its
immunity against compensation claims if it distributes project water in accord
with its own plans. d, the owner of a private, state-created consumptive water
right on a navigable stream cannot claim compensation for its destruction or
impairment. Neither can he claim compensation if in the distribution of project
water B is given a ratable share, even though under state law A's prior right
would preclude B or entitle B only to a lesser amount. Once the navigation
power has been exercised, A has no right to the water of the navigable stream
and thus to project water. Hence he cannot have a prior right to such water. To
allow compensation for the loss of priority is to assert that there may be private
property in navigable streams good against the United States. At this point in
the history of navigation power and navigation servitude such a proposition seems
378. See the conclusions arrived at in the preceding investigation, set forth in the
summaries under Parts I, II.
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impossible to maintain-at least under the assumption that a congressional
decision to disregard state-created priorities in the distribution of project water
would be based on a sound and reasonable policy judgment as to the best use
of the resource.
37 9
The rule of no compensation therefore extends to the loss of state-created
priorities.
C. Estoppel In Favor Of Consumptive JJater Rights
1. Estoppel through federal inaction or federal license
As will be recalled, in every decision after Monongahela Nay. Co. v.
United States3 80 estoppel has failed to prevent the loss of private water rights
without compensation upon the exercise of the navigation power. Prolonged
congressional inaction was said not to "prohibit future exertion of federal
control." 3 8 1 The principle seems too firmly established and, for that matter, too
reasonable to be abandoned merely because consumptive water rights are in-
volved.
Nor did the possession of a federal license lead to estoppel. In Chandler-Dun-
bar,382 the Secretary of the Army had licensed water power works under provi-
sions of the Rivers and Harbors Act. The licensee acquired no "right to maintain
these constructions . . . longer than the government should continue the li-
cense." 383
But if the license gave no vested right to the maintenance of the plant, it
could hardly have given a vested right to the use of the water. The fate of water
379.The reasoning here employed may evoke uncomfortable associations with "un-
constitutional conditions," i.e., with the doctrine which says that because a state may
withhold a privilege altogether, it is not necessarily permitted to condition its grant on the
surrender of constitutional rights. But aside from the quite different circumstances typi-
cally surrounding the unconstitutional condition problem, two points bear on the present
discussion. One, as Hale points out: "it is not the law that the exertion of a power is al-
ways unconstitutional when its purpose is to induce the foregoing of constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court has sustained many such exertions of power even after announcing
the broad doctrine that would invalidate them." Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and
Constitutional Rights, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 321, 322 (1935). Two, there is even less doubt
as to the state's conditioning power where it exerts its interest to conserve highways and
improve traffic conditions. See Hale, supra at 349 citing to such cases as Stephenson v.
Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932) (Texas statute required surrender of right of private con-
tract carrier to fix its own rates). Under the assumption made in the text (a reasonable
policy judgment leading to the disregard of state priorities) it is hard to believe that the
Court would upset the congressional judgment by a strained use of the doctrine of uncon-
stitutional conditions. But it may be that "reasonableness" here would be the subject of
greater Court scrutiny than is the case with other aspects of the congressional exercise of
the navigation power, discussed previously.
380. 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
381. Mr. Justice Brandeis in Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 454 (1931).
382. 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
383. Id. at 68.
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use and plant are so inextricably interwoven 8 4 that whatever would maintain
the one (and be it on the basis of estoppel) would seem to maintain the other.
If therefore a license under the Rivers and Harbors Act does not protect the
diversion works against the later exercise of the navigation power and the effects
of the navigation servitude, then it does not protect the consumptive use of water,
which alone makes the presence of the works necessary in the first place.
Conceivably, the diversion of the water itself could be the subject of the
license rather than the construction to be undertaken and the structures to be
placed in the river.385 However, even if that were the contents of the license, it
would still fall under the principles laid down in Chandler-Dunbar. Congres-
sional authority to deal with the stream would remain the same as if no such
license had ever been granted.
Specific congressional authorization finally proved equally inefficacious as a
basis for estoppel. In Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States,8 6 congressional
authorization for the construction of claimant's bridge did not create any "vested
rights." That Congress was motivated by its urgent need arising from
the Civil War to encourage private bridge construction was immaterial.
Of course, the Court has never precluded estoppel against the exercise of the
navigation power as a doctrinally inapplicable principle. 8 7 Given the "right
case" therefore it could distinguish both Chandler-Dunbar and Louisville Bridge
Co. 3
8 8
Many will undoubtedly see the "right case" to lie in the mere fact that ir-
rigation water rights are involved. A number of arguments can be made in
support of that position. One is the crucial importance of these rights in the arid
and semi-arid states of the West. Another is the substantial investments that
would be destroyed without compensation were the United States (for instance)
to appropriate the entire flow of a major stream-system. A third is the fact that
384. See the Court's reasoning in Chandler-Dunbar when dealing with the "raw
water" claim for the falls and rapids; the company being prohibited from placing in the
river structures needed for the exploitation of the water power, had no claim to any ele-
ment of value constituted by the presence of such water power.
385. The Republic Steel case suggests that diversion might be a proper subject for a
license under the Rivers and Harbors Act. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362
U.S. 482 (1960) (Justices Harlan, Frankfurter, Whittaker and Stewart dissented). It
held that the discharge of water containing suspended minute particles of industrial
waste solids created an "obstruction" of the navigable capacity of the Calumet River
within the meaning of the first, general clause of section 10. For a discussion of some of
the problems raised by the facts of the Steel case, see Note, Substantive and Remedial
Problems in Preventing Interferences with Navigation: The Republic Steel Case, 59
Colum. L. Rev. 1065 (1959).
386. 242 U.S. 409 (1917).
387. See the Court's language in the above case, "We do not go so far as to say that
Congress could not in any case, . . . by . . . estoppel, prevent itself . . . " Id. at 417.
388. Just as the latter distinguished Monongahela as involving a "clear taking over"
of property.
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many of these investments were made before "navigation" comprehended the
construction of basin-wide, multi-purpose, multi-million-dollar dam and reser-
voir projects. For these investments, at least, there was no meaningful "notice"
of the paramount federal right. Certain federal legislation supports the argu-
ment: legislation which sought to encourage the settlement of arid areas ;389
legislation recognizing and protecting state-created rights.390 Both fostered the
expectation of continued congressional deference to unique Western water
problems. There is finally Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United States"'1
repeatedly distinguished but never overruled. Thus there is precedent, however
weak, for the proposition that Congress may be estopped to take without com-
pensation that which has come into existence by its "instance and implied in-
vitation." 
392
All of these arguments add up to a showing of reasonable expectations and of
grounds on which Congress could be estopped. Probability indeed speaks against
it. All of the considerations set forth above presumably were before Congress
when it decided in the given instance to exercise the full sweep of its power. Its
decision to take without compensation therefore implies a negative judgment
regarding the desirability of a preferential treatment of consumptive rights. The
Court has repeatedly and emphatically spoken of the "legislative" and "conclu-
sive" character of congressional dealings with the nation's waterways. It has
indicated little willingness to examine what is "for Congress and Congress alone
to evaluate." 39 3 It is not very probable that the Court will enter such a re-
examination in the name of "estoppel."
Nor would it be desirable for the Court to do so. All irrigation water rights
are not automatically of greater importance to the welfare of the community
(and hence worthier of protection) than all franchises for power development.
Nor are the expectations of an irrigation water right owner automatically more
reasonable than those of a franchise holder. Finally, the investment of the former
may or may not be more substantial than that of the latter. A judicially evolved
rule working merely in favor of consumptive rights is therefore unjustified. If
Western water rights as a class indeed deserve more protection than the rights
of other water users, Congress can, after all, provide for compensation in the
authorization of any project affecting such rights.
2. Estoppel through federal participation
The question to be examined here is the likelihood of estoppel where the
389. Such as the Homestead Act and the Desert Land Act, for example.
390. See Section 8 of the Reclamation Act, section 18 of the Boulder Canyon Project
Act.
391. 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
392. Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82, 89 (1913).
393. Mr. Justice Douglas for the Court in United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350
U.S. 222, 224 (1956).
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United States has actively participated in the creation of the right involved. One
such situation arises under the Reclamation Act. Inter alia, it empowers the
United States to divert, store and distribute water A94 Since Ickes v. Fox
3 9 5
however it has been clear that the complete control thus exercised does not result
in vesting "ownership" of the water or the water rights in the United States.
Rather, "by the terms of the law ' 3 9 6 appropriations are made for the use of the
landowners and "water-rights [become their] . . . property . . . wholly dis-
tinct from the property right of the government in the irrigation works. ' 397 It
has been suggested3 98 that these property rights are vested rights which may not
be taken without the payment of compensation. The reasons given are that the
right arises under the act and that the act makes no distinction between navigable
and non-navigable waters. Given therefore a diversion made directly by the fed-
eral government under this particular legislation, a subsequently attempted
exercise of the navigation power would lose its immunity as against any "fed-
erally created," vested rights to the use of navigable waters.8 99
It is indeed logical to argue that the United States may not take, or at least
may not take without compensation, a right it itself has bestowed upon the poten-
tial claimant. However, it is equally logical to follow a different line of reason-
ing: there can be no doubt that the United States could, under the navigation
power, appropriate the entire flow of any navigable stream. No obligation would
rest upon it to compensate for private rights destroyed in the course of such
appropriation. Nor is there any basis for an obligation on the part of the United
States to create vested rights in landowners to whom impounded water is distrib-
uted. The repeated emphasis in Ickes v. Fox that the water rights became the
property of the landowners "under the Reclamation Act" and "by the terms of
the law" implies that but for "the terms of the law" water and water rights
would have been as much "property" of the United States as were the irrigation
works. If Congress nevertheless, that is without any constitutional obligation to
do so, creates vested rights in individual landowners, then clearly it may condi-
tion the exercise of its bounty. That principle admits of no doubt where the con-
dition is express (as well as reasonable) as for instance the so-called 160-acre
limitation contained in Section 5 of the Reclamation Act and upheld in Ivanhoe
394. Whatever water rights it has to acquire to carry out the construction of the
project are, of course, compensable. See United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339
U.S. 725 (1950).
395. 300 U.S. 82 (1937).
396. Id. at 95.
397. Ibid.
'398. Note, Federal-State Conflicts over the Control of Western Waters, 60 Colum. L.
Rev. 967 (1960).
399. Id. at 998, n. 193.
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Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken.400 There could be just as little doubt regard-
ing the constitutionality of an express prior provision subjecting such "vested
rights" as were involved in Ickes v. Fox to the navigation power, if and when
changed conditions make its subsequent exercise necessary or desirable.
The question neither Ickes v. Fox nor Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. Mc-
Cracken nor, of course, the Reclamation Act answer is whether such a prior
condition may be implied on the basis of a presumed congressional intent not to
surrender its navigation power at the time of the creation of "vested rights" in
navigable streams. An affirmative answer would logically be as plausible as a
negative one. Policy considerations rather than logic would have to furnish the
basis for deciding the conflict. The role played by the United States in the crea-
tion of these "vested rights" may exert a strong pull in the direction of estoppel.
There is a difference between active federal participation and assistance on one
hand and passive tolerance of stream uses on the other, whether carried out
under state sanction or under a "mere" federal license. The difference may be,
but need not be decisive. Of necessity, the case for estoppel weakens as the federal
activity allegedly providing its basis moves away from the "creation" of vested
rights and toward the "passive" end of the spectrum of federal involvement.
Hence such federal assistance as was received by some California appropriators
of navigable waters in making their appropriations may estop the federal govern-
ment from now asserting the navigation servitude-but again, need not do so,
as has been argued on behalf of these appropriators in the present Arizona v.
California controversy. 401
In general, therefore, the conclusions reached earlier as to the non-compen-
sability of consumptive water rights on navigable streams remain unchanged.
Estoppel in favor of state-created rights from congressional inaction or federal
license is most improbable. Estoppel in favor of "federally-derived" rights, or in
favor of rights clearly created under state law but with active federal assistance
is a conceivable but by no means an inevitable consequence.
3. Estoppel through the Desert Land Act
The Desert Land Act was signed into law on March 3, 1877.402 Its primary
objective was the facilitation of desert land reclamation on the public domain
400. 357 U.S. 275 (1958). Section 5 prescribes that "No right to the use of water for
land in private ownership shall be sold for a tract exceeding 160 acres to any one land-
owner.. '
401. See note 399 supra.
402. Act of March 3, 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377, as amended, 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1952).
At the time of its passage, it applied to the states of California, Oregon and Nevada and
the territories of Washington, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Wyoming, Arizona, New Mexico
and Dakota. Colorado was included in an 1891 amendment. Act of March 3, 1891, ch.
561, § 8, 26 Stat. 1097.
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in the West. 40 3 It therefore gave certain entrymen the right to appropriate water
sufficient for the irrigation of 640 acres. In addition Section 1 contained this
proviso:
and all surplus water over and above such actual. appropriation and
use, together with the water of all lakes, rivers, and other sources of
water supply upon the public lands and not navigable, shall remain
and be held free for the appropriation and use of the public .... 404
Complex problems have arisen from the Desert Land Act and particularly
from the language set forth. They consist of conflicting assertions regarding the
power of disposition over Western waters generally, 4°5 and of federal proprietary
claims to the unappropriated waters of non-navigable streams in the Desert Land
Act states.
40 6
403. But note that Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma and Texas, generally included in
references to the "arid and semi-arid Western states" are not (and never have been)
subject to the Desert Land Act. (Inasmuch as Texas was admitted through annexation
of the Republic of Texas, it retained title to the public lands within its borders.)
404. The language of Section 1 is unchanged, except for the limitation to 320 acres.
See 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1958). (Emphasis added.) In the present Arizona v. California con-
troversy, Arizona has argued that the express limitation to non-navigable waters pre-
vented, by implication, valid appropriations from navigable waters. The sparse legisla-
tive history of the Desert Land Act contains absolutely nothing to support that conten-
tion. The words "and not navigable" were added by a conference committee. No reason
was given for the addition. See 5 Cong. Rec. 2156 (1877). Furthermore, dominion over
navigable waters is an incident of sovereignty. It is deemed to pass with the transfer
of sovereignty from the United States to the states. See United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S.
1, 4 (1935). There are no indications anywhere that the United States ever meant to
withhold such control from the states. On the other hand, transfer of sovereignty alone
would not have been sufficient to pass control over non-navigable streams. These rules
may well explain the limitation of the Desert Land Act to non-navigable waters. Fina .y,
it has been clear since United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co., 174 U.S. 690
(1899) that the Desert Land Act did not operate as a self-imposed, statutory limitation on
Congress of its control over navigable waterways. But the fact that Congress fully
maintained its prerogative to exercise the navigation power over navigable streams does
not mean that no valid rights exist between users of such streams inter sese.
405. For an exhaustive analysis of the different theories and the entire problem of
federal-state relations see 60 Colum. L. Rev. supra note 398. For an early treatment of
the same questions see Bannister, The Question of Federal Disposition of State Waters
in the Priority States, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 270 (1914).
406. See the "Pelton Dam" case, FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955) upholding fed-
eral authority to license a project on the non-navigable Deschutes River, although in
violation of Oregon law. The Deschutes flows through reserved federal lands (on which
the dam was to be built), withdrawn from entry in 1910. It has been asserted that the
case can be explained only on the basis of an existing proprietary right of the United
States in the unappropriated waters of non-navigable streams, at least in the Desert Land
Act states. See 60 Colum. L. Rev. supra note 398. Corker, Water Rights and Federalism-
The Western Water Rights Settlement Bill of 1957, 45 Calif. L. Rev. 604 (1957) reads
the case as impliedly at least recognizing riparian rights in federal lands. He fears as an
extreme consequence that federal condemnation of private riparian land in a priority
state will bring into existence riparian rights to surplus water in the United States. On the
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For the present inquiry, however, it suffices that the Court in California Ore-
gon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co. 40 7 viewed the Desert Land Act
as having severed the waters of the public domain from the public lands, and as
permitting each state to determine its own rule of water law. 408 The United
States thus shared its control over the non-navigable waters in the Desert Land
Act states.409 The question to be answered is whether the disposition made in the
Desert Land Act estops the United States from destroying private rights to the
use of these waters under the navigation power.410 It seems that the United
States is not estopped. 411 No real argument can be made out that the United
States, by exercising its superior power, would be taking what it itself gave.
That argument is possible under the Ickes v. Fox construction of the Reclamation
Act.412 The Desert Land Act, however, did not "by its terms" vest ownership
of the waters in the individual user. 418 It merely shared control over these waters
with the designated states. The rights that would be destroyed by a later exercise
other hand, it has been argued that the case is merely an instance of federal immunity
from state regulation and does not subject present appropriative rights to latent riparian
rights of reserved land. See Sato, Water Reuroces-Comments Upon the Federal-State
Relationship, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 43 (1960).
407. 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
408. The Court thus followed that part of the so-called "Oregon Doctrine" which
(starting from the premise of a federal proprietary right in waters on the public domain)
regarded the Desert Land Act as effecting a severance of the waters from the public
domain. Hence, post-1877 federal patents to riparian land do not convey any water rights
in appropriation states. See 60 Colum. L. Rev. supra note 398 at 973-74. But the Court did
not adopt that part of the Oregon Doctrine which held that the Desert Land Act estab-
lished the rule of appropriation as the uniform rule in the Desert Land Act states.
409. In a state following an appropriation system, therefore, private rights vest only
to the extent of actual appropriations, thus presumably leaving the United States free to
reserve the rest. 60 Colum. L. Rev. supra note 398 at 988 et seq., pointing out further that
under this theory, a state by adopting a riparian system could deprive the United States
of all claims to water except to the extent that it still owned riparian land. Id. at 993.
410. The Desert Land Act deals only with non-navigable waters. However, the teach-
ing of Grand River Dam Authority is that private rights in non-navigable waters may
be affected by the navigation servitude and hence be non-compensable if destroyed in the
express exercise of the navigation power on the non-navigable tributary in order to pro-
tect the navigable capacity of the mainstream. Also, of course, streams "non-navigable"
in 1877 may well be "navigable" in 1962.
411. Nor was the Desert Land Act a (voluntary) statutory limitation on the exercise
of the navigation power. That contention was rejected by the Court in United States v.
Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899). Referring to the acts of 1866 and
1877, Mr. Justice Brewer wrote: "To hold that Congress, by these acts, meant to confer
upon any State the right to appropriate all the waters of the tributary streams which
unite into a navigable watercourse, and so destroy the navigability of that watercourse
in derogation of the interests of all the people of the United States, is a construction
which cannot be tolerated. It ignores the spirit of the legislation and carries the statute
to the verge of the letter and far beyond what.., must be held to have been the intent of
Congress." Id. at 706-07.
412. See discussion in text at note 395 rupra.
413. At most this might be said about the water appropriated to irrigate the 640 (or
320 respectively) acres allowed entrymen under the Act.
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of the navigation power are clearly state-created rights. Furthermore, they are
created with no more federal participation than the passive approval expressed
in the Desert Land Act.
41 4
The argument could next be advanced that the Desert Land Act was designed
to encourage settlement of the desert states. Investments were therefore made
with the reasonable expectation of the continued protection of crucial water
rights. The argument has merits. But so have the arguments that can be made
out for all Western consumptive water rights. The same objections to their
automatic preferential treatment by judicial fiat hold here as held above. 415 That
the definition of "navigable stream" has changed and that therefore the naviga-
tion power as well as the navigation servitude affect waters that were non-
navigable in 1877 is not unique to the Desert Land Act states. Yet the Court
has never examined whether the non-compensable destruction of private property
on navigable streams was justified because the stream was "navigable" at the
time the property in question was created.
The result would be no different if private property were destroyed not be-
cause the stream is now "navigable" but because at stake is the navigable capacity
of the mainstream. At a very early date, United States v. Rio Grande Dam &
Irr. Co.4 1 6 held that the protection of that capacity extended to non-navi-
gable stretches of the mainstream. It was logical to assume even then that the
rule would extend to non-navigable tributaries which affected the navigable capa-
city of the mainstream. But again, of course, the absence of any meaningful
"notice" is not really decisive.
In fine, it is suggested that United States v. Grand River Dam Authority
4 17
would be decided no differently had the issue arisen in a Desert Land Act state.
D. Consumptive Water Rights On Non-Navigable Streams
There remains one other question posed at the outset: Do any of the above
results change because the stream in question is the non-navigable tributary of a
navigable mainstream? The answer is "no" where the United States, as in the
Grand River Dam case, expressly exercises its power over the non-navigable tri-
butary in order to "protect the navigable capacity" of the mainstream. Such an
express exercise of the federal power eliminates, in effect, all distinction between
"navigable" and "non-navigable" for that stream. On the other hand, destruc-
tion or impairment of consumptive water rights incidental to an exercise of the
414. Again, there may be more than passive approval as to the waters appropriated
for the irrigation of land acquired under the Desert Land Act. However, as to these
water rights, the same arguments would hold that can be advanced against water rights
acquired "by the terms" of the Reclamation Act. That is, estoppel is possible but not con-
clusive. See discussion in text at note 395 supra.
415. See discussion in sections (1) and (2), under Part III, C supra.
416. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
417. 363 U.S. 229 (1960).
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navigation power only on the mainstream should, under the rule of United States
v Cress41 and United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 419 be as fully com-
pensable as damage to the non-consumptive rights was in those cases.
E. Valuation Of Desert Uplands
Finally, brief consideration shall be given to a fear that has repeatedly been
voiced, namely that the full application of navigation power and servitude prin-
ciples will lead to the evaluation of desert uplands as dry land rather than as ir-
rigated land when taken in connection with a navigation power project. 42 0 As
was shown earlier, the evaluation of uplands excludes any consideration of their
adaptability as dam sites. That was so because the value thus added to the land
derived "in the end" from the stream itself.42 ' It was, in other words, dependent
on a right to the water which the United States could destroy without compen-
sation. Similarly, of course, it could be said that such value as is added to desert
land by irrigation is dependent on the consumptive use of water, a use which
can be destroyed without compensation by the exercise of the navigation power.
The non-compensable destruction of that which gave the land its additional value
would thus lead to the non-compensable destruction of that additional value
itself. On purely logical terms, therefore, the fears regarding the evaluation of
irrigated desert land are justified.
F. Summary
These then are the conclusions regarding the compensability of consumptive
water rights against a valid exercise of the navigation power:
(1) No compensation is due where the United States destroys or impairs a
state-created, consumptive water right on a navigable stream.
(2) No compensation is due where the United States ignores state-created
priorities in the distribution of project water among intrastate users.
(3) Federal inaction or the issuance of a revocable federal license most
probably will not lead to an estoppel of the United States in favor of consumptive
water rights.
(4) Federal participation in the creation of the consumptive water right
could afford a basis for estoppel. However, this is not an inevitable or necessary
consequence.
418. 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
419. 339 U.S. 799 (1950).
420. Silverstein, Jr., The Legal Concept of Navigability v. Navigability in Fact, 19
Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 49 (1946) ; Note, The Supreme Court 1955 Term, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 83,
134 (1956).
421. See Mr. Justice Douglas in United States v. Twin City Power Co.: "That special
location value is due to the flow of the stream . . ." 350 U.S. at 226.
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(5) The sharing of control over non-navigable waters in the Desert Land
Act affords no special grounds on which to estop the United States.
(6) Consumptive water rights on non-navigable tributaries are treated in
all respects like consumptive water rights on the navigable mainstream. That
is so where the United States expressly exercises its power over the non-navigable
tributary in order to protect the navigable capacity of the mainstream.
(7) Consumptive water rights on non-navigable tributaries are compensable
if the exercise of the navigation power is limited to the mainstream.
(8) There is support for the proposition that desert uplands will be valued
as dry land rather than as irrigated land when taken in connection with a naviga-
tion power project.
CONCLUSION
The present investigation bears out a good many of the claims that are made
regarding the almost complete power of Congress over the nation's waterways,
at least over those waterways substantial enough to warrant their potential in-
clusion in basin-wide reservoir projects. Moreover, the limits of that power are
largely self-determined and they are judicially unchecked save for limitations
implied by the Court's reference to a "reasonable exercise" of the congressional
power. But it may be well to keep in mind that much the same observations can
be made with regard to congressional power in the general area of the commerce
clause. Whatever is "unique" therefore about the navigation power seems a point
of quantity rather than of quality.
But there is a "unique" or "anomalous" aspect to the navigation servitude. It
is evidenced by those cases where the non-compensable taking of private property
cannot be explained as an incident of non-compensable regulation in the exercise
of a regulatory power. On the contrary, that same private property would be
compensable if taken for a different public purpose in exercise of a different
regulatory power. As a matter of public policy, the diverging results seem hard
to justify.
But there is another reason which makes a reconsideration of the servitude
appear desirable. As has been pointed out, the Court has never given a satisfactory
explanation for the rule of no compensation. The analysis of the cases has often
proved difficult for it, as is witnessed by the Cress, Willow River, Kansas City
confusion, the inconsistent awards in Chandler-Dunbar and the attribution of
non-riparian values to a flowage easement in Virginia Electric. At times the
Court has indeed preferred mechanical rules, as in the mainstream-tributary
riparian controversy, to the difficult task of a meaningful accommodation be-
tween public and private interests.
The thought occurs that a good deal of the difficulty lies in the manner in
which the navigation servitude has been permitted to grow from a rule securing
free and unhindered passage on navigable waterways to its present scope. The
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process seems less the result of studied consideration than of confusion between
the national power and non-compensability. The cases leave the impression that
the Court treated the expansion of the navigation power and the expansion of
the range of non-compensable losses as interchangeable questions. Yet that is by
no means a necessary approach. The Court could have upheld the expansion of
the navigation power (as it eventually upheld the expansion of the general com-
merce power) and still have limited the servitude to its historical meaning of a
right of way. And it could have used general eminent domain principles to solve
such questions as dam site value and compensation for water power franchises.
Being on far more familiar ground, the Court could thus have devoted its atten-
tion to the accommodation process between conflicting interests-rather than
seeking a solution in the somewhat mystical references to the "supreme," "com-
plete," "dominant" power in the exercise of which the United States "is beholden
to no one." Furthermore, if the public interest is indeed the overriding considera-
tion, that result can clearly be achieved under such eminent domain rules as "the
value to the owner test." But again, the basis of both analysis and result would
be far clearer than they are now.
It may well be too late in the day for the Court to develop a set of meaningful
tools for dealing with navigation cases. If so, then the question of compensation
rests ultimately and finally with Congress. Perhaps political checks will thus as-
sure that the cost of multi-million-dollar projects bearing little, if any, relation
to navigation will be borne by the community as a whole-or, conversely, that
all arteries of commerce will then be given the same preferential treatment now
limited for historical reasons to waterways. In neither event, of course, is there
any interference with the congressional power of (non-compensable) "regula-
tion" of private property in the exercise of the congressional trust over the "navi-
gable" waters of the nation in the interest of all the people of the Union.
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